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In the US constitutional system, the president generally conducts foreign relations. But not always. In recent years, the courts and Congress have repeatedly taken
steps to interact directly with foreign governments. Nonexecutive conduct of foreign
relations occurs when the courts or Congress engage in or take actions that result in
the opening of a direct channel of official communications between the US nonexecutive branch and a foreign executive branch. Nonexecutive conduct of foreign
relations raises serious constitutional questions, but to date there is no clear rubric
for analyzing the constitutionality of the judiciary’s or Congress’s actions. Moreover,
nonexecutive conduct of foreign relations is likely to become more frequent due to
changes in technology, foreign governments’ increasing sophistication about the US
government, hyperpartisanship in the United States, and what might be called the
“Trump effect.”
Building on Justice Robert Jackson’s iconic tripartite framework from
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co v Sawyer, this Article proposes a converse
Youngstown framework for determining when nonexecutive conduct of foreign relations is constitutional. The converse Youngstown framework judges the
constitutionality of the courts’ or Congress’s actions in light of executive authorization
or condonation (Category 1), executive silence (Category 2), or executive opposition
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(Category 3). The converse Youngstown framework offers significant advantages
over the current ad hoc approach to analyzing nonexecutive conduct of foreign relations, and it avoids some of the pitfalls that critics have identified with traditional
Youngstown analysis. First, it more accurately reflects the fact that the president
isn’t the only actor who exercises foreign relations initiative. Second, it avoids much
of the indeterminacy that plagues traditional Youngstown analysis. Finally, it simplifies the constitutional analysis of nonexecutive conduct of foreign relations by explaining why easy cases are easy, allowing courts to engage in constitutional avoidance in some cases, and showing how Congress and the courts may sometimes trump
the executive, even in Category 3.
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INTRODUCTION
In the US constitutional system, the executive branch generally conducts foreign relations.1 But in recent years, the

1
See, for example, American Insurance Association v Garamendi, 539 US 396, 414
(2003) (“[T]he historical gloss on the ‘executive Power’ vested in Article II of the
Constitution has recognized the President’s ‘vast share of responsibility for the conduct of
our foreign relations.’”), quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co v Sawyer, 343 US 579, 610–
11 (1952) (Frankfurter concurring); First National City Bank v Banco Nacional de Cuba,
406 US 759, 767–68 (1972) (noting that the Court “has recognized the primacy of the
Executive in the conduct of foreign relations” and that the executive branch is “charged
. . . with primary responsibility for the conduct of foreign affairs”). See also Curtis A.
Bradley and Jack L. Goldsmith, Foreign Relations Law: Cases and Materials 145–46
(Aspen 6th ed 2017) (“Congress has an elaborate institutional machinery devoted to foreign relations[, but] despite its broad powers and institutional expertise, Congress generally does not conduct U.S. foreign relations.”); id at 155 (“[T]he President is often described
as having the dominant role in the conduct of U.S. foreign relations.”); Louis Henkin,
Foreign Affairs and the United States Constitution 42 (Clarendon 2d ed 1996) (“That the
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nonexecutive branches—the judiciary and Congress—have challenged the exclusivity of the president’s authority to conduct foreign relations by opening direct channels of communication with
foreign governments’ executive branches. For example, in
January 2015, Speaker of the House John Boehner invited Israeli
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to address Congress,
breaking protocol by failing to coordinate with the White House.2
Two months later, forty-seven Republican senators, led by
Senator Tom Cotton, penned a letter to the leaders of Iran in an
attempt to undermine the executive branch’s negotiations to halt
Iran’s nuclear program.3 More recently, Senator John McCain independently reached out to the Australian ambassador to smooth
over relations after President Donald Trump “abruptly ended” a
call with Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull.4
These contacts challenge conventional understandings about
the constitutional separation of powers. Although the judiciary
decides cases related to foreign affairs,5 and Congress exercises
fiscal, treaty, and other powers that affect foreign relations,6 generally the executive branch actually conducts foreign relations,
interacting directly with representatives of foreign governments’

President is the sole organ of official communication by and to the United States has not
been questioned and has not been a source of significant controversy.”).
2
See notes 93–111 and accompanying text.
3
See notes 127–37 and accompanying text.
4
Greg Miller and Philip Rucker, ‘This Was the Worst Call by Far’: Trump Badgered,
Bragged and Abruptly Ended Phone Call with Australian Leader (Wash Post, Feb 2, 2017),
archived at http://perma.cc/9XTY-F9NP. See also Statement by SASC Chairman John
McCain on U.S.-Australia Alliance (John McCain, Feb 2, 2017), archived at
http://perma.cc/M6VF-Z9DJ (reporting on McCain’s phone call with Ambassador Joe
Hockey).
5
See, for example, RJR Nabisco, Inc v European Community, 136 S Ct 2090, 2099–
2106 (2016) (addressing the extraterritorial reach of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act); Samantar v Yousef, 560 US 305, 325 (2010) (holding that the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act does not govern a defendant’s claim to foreign official immunity); Medellín v Texas, 552 US 491, 504–06 (2008) (discussing the doctrine of
treaty self-execution).
6
See US Const Art I, § 8 (giving Congress the powers, inter alia, to “regulate Commerce with foreign Nations” and to “declare War”); US Const Art II, § 2 (qualifying the
president’s treaty power by requiring “the Advice and Consent of the Senate” in the process). See also, for example, American Insurance Association, 539 US at 414 (recognizing
that the president has independent foreign affairs powers, but that “Congress holds express authority to regulate public and private dealings with other nations in its war and
foreign commerce powers”); Bradley and Goldsmith, Foreign Relations Law at 146 (cited
in note 1) (noting that “Congress [ ] exercises significant influence on U.S. foreign policy”
because of its “power of the purse” and other institutional powers); id at 136 (“Article I of
the Constitution confers on Congress numerous powers relating to the conduct of foreign
relations.”) (emphasis added).
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executive branches.7 The Netanyahu invitation and other
examples deviate from this model. Moreover, courts, Congress,
executive officials, and commentators lack a framework—much
less an agreed-upon framework—for assessing whether the
actions nonetheless comply with the Constitution.
Actors within and outside the three branches of government
often analyze separation-of-powers disputes using the tripartite
framework set out in Justice Robert Jackson’s concurring opinion
in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co v Sawyer.8 Jackson’s Youngstown
framework assumes, however, that the action in question is an
executive action that must be judged in light of Congress’s approval, silence, or disapproval. The Netanyahu invitation and
other examples disrupt this assumption: their defining feature is
the initiative exercised by the nonexecutive branch in engaging
in direct contacts with foreign governments.
Building on the Netanyahu invitation, the Cotton letter, and
additional historical and recent examples, this Article identifies
“nonexecutive conduct of foreign relations” as a discrete category
of constitutional questions and then proposes a “converse
Youngstown” framework for resolving separation-of-powers disputes when the branch whose actions are at issue is Congress or
the judiciary.
Nonexecutive conduct of foreign relations occurs when a nonexecutive branch—the courts or Congress—engages in or takes
actions that result in the opening of a direct channel of official
communications between the US nonexecutive branch and a foreign executive branch. Although the courts and Congress often
take actions that affect foreign policy, the direct conduct of relations with foreign governments has long been understood as the
province of the executive.9 It is precisely the incongruity of
conduct that would be considered diplomacy if done by executive

7

See note 1 (collecting sources).
343 US 579, 635–38 (1952) (Jackson concurring).
9
See Bradley and Goldsmith, Foreign Relations Law at 172 (cited in note 1) (“In
practice, the Executive Branch exercises a virtual monopoly over formal communications
with foreign nations.”); Henkin, Foreign Affairs at 88 (cited in note 1) (“Since the early
years [ ], Congress has not seriously doubted that the President is the sole organ of communication with foreign governments: Congress does not speak or receive communications
on behalf of the United States, or negotiate with foreign governments, or ‘conduct foreign
relations.’”); Curtis A. Bradley and Jack L. Goldsmith, Presidential Control over
International Law, 131 Harv L Rev 1201, 1258 (2018) (noting that the president is “understood to be the official organ of the United States in diplomacy”). See also note 1 (collecting sources).
8
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officials being undertaken by nonexecutive officials that renders
the actions constitutionally suspect.10
The need to determine the constitutionality or unconstitutionality of nonexecutive conduct of foreign relations (or “nonexecutive foreign relations,” for short) is rendered more urgent
because several factors suggest that the phenomenon is likely to
become more frequent going forward. Most basically, technology
has made international communications easier, and, as other
scholars have noted,11 technology facilitates the formation of horizontal transnational government networks between US government entities and their foreign counterparts. It does the same for
the diagonal transnational networks—that is, Congress to foreign
executives and the judiciary to foreign executives—at issue in
nonexecutive foreign relations. Foreign governments have also
become more sophisticated about disaggregating the US government. Increased familiarity with the US policy process allows foreign governments to forum shop, reaching out to potentially sympathetic audiences in US government entities other than their
traditional State Department interlocutors. Perhaps most importantly, the hyperpartisanship that dominates US political discourse, especially when combined with the Trump administration’s perceived incompetence at and inattention to diplomacy,
will incentivize US officials outside the executive branch to reach
out to foreign governments. It may also incentivize foreign officials to seek interlocutors outside the executive branch in order
to hedge their bets by engaging broadly with actors across the US
political spectrum.
By definition, all incidents of nonexecutive foreign relations
involve the same powers on the part of the executive—namely,
the powers to appoint ambassadors with the advice and consent
of the Senate and to receive ambassadors. Nonexecutive foreign
relations incidents vary, however, in which powers (if any) of the
nonexecutive branch they involve. This variance allows for the
10 I do not use the term “diplomacy” to describe nonexecutive conduct of foreign relations because to do so carries normative implications. Calling judicial or legislative interactions with foreign executives “diplomacy” may have a legitimating effect that suggests
the actions are necessarily constitutional. Or, on the other hand, it could suggest that the
judicial and legislative actors are acting unconstitutionally by taking on executive-branch
roles as diplomats. To avoid either implication, I have chosen the neutral term “nonexecutive conduct of foreign relations” (“nonexecutive foreign relations,” for short), saving
the constitutional assessment for Part III. But see Ryan M. Scoville, Legislative
Diplomacy, 112 Mich L Rev 331, 334 (2013) (defining the term “legislative diplomacy” as
“diplomacy by Congress or one of its members”).
11 See note 156 and accompanying text.
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creation of a typology of nonexecutive foreign relations incidents
based on whether the nonexecutive branch is receiving communications from a foreign government (“inbound nonexecutive foreign relations”) or is purporting to convey information to a foreign
government (“outbound nonexecutive foreign relations”). The difference between inbound and outbound nonexecutive foreign relations affects the constitutional analysis.
This Article’s proposed converse Youngstown framework provides an analytically rigorous method for executive-branch officials, legislators, judges, and scholars to determine when nonexecutive foreign relations are and are not constitutionally
permissible.12 The converse Youngstown framework ensures that
the actions of the legislature or the judiciary are judged not only
by reference to the textual constitutional allocation of power, but
in light of executive authorization or condonation (Category 1),
executive silence (Category 2), or executive opposition (Category 3). As in traditional Youngstown analysis, the converse
Youngstown framework reveals how the relationship between
branches of the federal government can affect the constitutionality of each branch’s actions.
The converse Youngstown framework offers significant benefits over the current ad hoc approach to analyzing nonexecutive
conduct of foreign relations, and it also avoids some of the pitfalls
that critics have identified with traditional Youngstown analysis.
First, while the traditional Youngstown framework is designed to evaluate instances when the president exercises initiative, the converse Youngstown framework accounts for the fact
that sometimes Congress and the judiciary prevail in a race to
act. Converse Youngstown may actually incentivize greater initiative taking by the nonexecutive branches by mandating careful
consideration of their constitutional positions. Such initiative
taking may have the salutary effect of defending Congress and
the judiciary against executive claims that they have acquiesced
to executive assertions of power.
Second, the converse Youngstown framework is less susceptible to the indeterminacy that critics argue plagues the traditional Youngstown framework. In particular, Professor Laurence
Tribe has recently assailed Youngstown for being indeterminate
with respect to Category 2 cases—when the president acts in the
12 This Article focuses on nonexecutive conduct of foreign relations, but the converse
Youngstown framework can be applied to other constitutional disputes as well. See notes
282–84 and accompanying text (discussing other scenarios).
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face of congressional silence. Converse Youngstown avoids this
concern to a large extent because, due to structural differences
between the branches, the president is less likely than Congress
to remain silent, suggesting that there will be fewer Category 2
cases in converse Youngstown. Moreover, converse Youngstown
makes clearer the import of Category 2 cases that do occur. The
comparative ease with which the president can respond to actions
by the nonexecutive branches suggests that silence by the executive is a more meaningful signal of approval or acquiescence
than silence by Congress, which faces structural impediments to
action.
Finally, the converse Youngstown framework simplifies the
analysis of the constitutionality of nonexecutive foreign relations.
The current ad hoc approach to assessing the constitutionality of
particular nonexecutive foreign relations incidents does not account for the importance of the executive’s approval, acquiescence, or opposition.
The converse Youngstown framework explains why easy
cases are easy. In Category 1 cases, the converse Youngstown
framework changes the question from whether the nonexecutive
branch has independent authority for its action to whether the
nonexecutive branch’s power (if any) plus the power of the executive is constitutionally sufficient. Because the executive’s power
alone is likely to be sufficient in many instances, converse
Youngstown makes nonexecutive foreign relations incidents, done
with the approval of the president, easy questions. It also allows
adjudicators to engage in constitutional avoidance, obviating the
need to determine the precise scope of the nonexecutive branch’s
constitutional power in cases in which the executive’s power alone
is sufficient.
In addition, the converse Youngstown framework improves
upon ad hoc analysis for hard cases—those in Category 3, when
the president disapproves of the actions of the nonexecutive
branch. Using the converse Youngstown framework to assess Category 3 examples from Part II shows that the president should
often prevail when the nonexecutive branch engages in outbound
nonexecutive foreign relations, but that the implied powers of
both Congress and the judiciary generally put their assertions of
inbound nonexecutive foreign relations power on better footing.
As the Supreme Court’s recent opinion in Zivotofsky v Kerry13

13

135 S Ct 2076 (2015).
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(“Zivotofsky II”) demonstrates, the president can sometimes prevail even in Youngstown Category 3.14 Similarly, Congress and
the courts can prevail in converse Youngstown Category 3.
This Article proceeds in three Parts. Part I reviews traditional Youngstown analysis, highlighting how courts and nonjudicial actors have deployed Jackson’s tripartite framework.
Part II defines a typology of nonexecutive foreign relations incidents based on the constitutionally significant distinction between inbound and outbound foreign relations and proposes several reasons why nonexecutive conduct of foreign relations is
likely to accelerate. Part III then develops the converse
Youngstown framework and identifies the benefits it provides
over both ad hoc and classic Youngstown analysis.
I. TRADITIONAL YOUNGSTOWN ANALYSIS IN THEORY AND
PRACTICE
The facts of Youngstown are well known. During the Korean
War, a labor dispute arose between steel workers and steel companies, and to avert a nationwide strike that would have jeopardized the war effort, President Harry S. Truman issued Executive
Order 10340, which authorized the secretary of commerce to seize
and operate certain steel mills.15 The steel companies sued, arguing that the seizure was unconstitutional.16 In a short opinion by
Justice Hugo Black, the Supreme Court rejected the executive
branch’s argument that the president had inherent constitutional
power to issue the seizure order and invalidated the order on the
ground that it effectively made law—a power entrusted to
Congress, not the president.17
Justice Jackson’s concurrence has long overshadowed Black’s
majority opinion.18 Jackson, drawing on his own prior experience
14 Id at 2084, 2096 (holding that the president prevails in a Youngstown Category 3
case in which the president, based on his power to recognize foreign sovereigns, defied a
statute that purported to require him to list “Jerusalem, Israel” on passports).
15 Executive Order 10340 (1953), 3 CFR 65, 66.
16 Youngstown, 343 US at 583.
17 Id at 588–89.
18 See Henkin, Foreign Affairs at 94 (cited in note 1) (noting that Jackson’s
Youngstown concurrence “has become a starting point for constitutional discussion of concurrent powers”); Sarah H. Cleveland, Hamdi Meets Youngstown: Justice Jackson’s
Wartime Security Jurisprudence and the Detention of “Enemy Combatants,” 68 Albany L
Rev 1127, 1128 (2005) (“It is impossible to exaggerate the significance of Justice Jackson’s
concurrence in Youngstown for U.S. foreign relations jurisprudence.”); Edward T. Swaine,
The Political Economy of Youngstown, 83 S Cal L Rev 263, 266 (2010) (noting that
Jackson’s tripartite framework “has become Youngstown’s enduring legacy”).
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as an executive-branch lawyer,19 took a functionalist, practicebased approach to resolving separation-of-powers disputes.20
Jackson recognized that “[p]residential powers are not fixed but
fluctuate, depending upon their disjunction or conjunction with
those of Congress.”21 To channel judicial analysis of this presidential power fluctuation, Jackson proposed a tripartite framework.22
Category 1 includes instances “[w]hen the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress.”23 There
the president’s “authority is at its maximum, for it includes all
that he possesses in his own right plus all that Congress can delegate.”24 Presidential actions in Category 1 are, according to
Jackson, “supported by the strongest of presumptions and the
widest latitude of judicial interpretation.”25
Category 2 involves presidential action and congressional silence, creating a “zone of twilight in which [the president] and
Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain.”26 The president “can only rely upon his own independent powers,” but “congressional inertia, indifference or
quiescence may sometimes, at least as a practical matter, enable,
if not invite, measures on independent presidential responsibility.”27 Unlike Categories 1 and 3, which each come with a

19 See, for example, Noah Feldman, Scorpions: The Battles and Triumphs of FDR’s
Great Supreme Court Justices 366–67 (Twelve 2010) (discussing the positions that Jackson
had taken on executive power when he served as President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s attorney general). Jackson cited his prior executive-branch experience in his opinion.
Youngstown, 343 US at 634 (Jackson concurring) (“A judge, like an executive adviser, may
be surprised at the poverty of really useful and unambiguous authority applicable to concrete problems of executive power as they actually present themselves.”) (emphasis
added); id at 647 (Jackson concurring) (“[A] judge cannot accept self-serving press statements of the attorney for one of the interested parties as authority in answering a constitutional question, even if the advocate was himself.”).
20 See Youngstown, 343 US at 635 (Jackson concurring) (arguing that “[t]he actual
art of governing under our Constitution does not and cannot conform to judicial definitions
of the power of any of its branches based on isolated clauses or even single Articles torn
from context,” but rather “the Constitution [ ] contemplates that practice will integrate
the dispersed powers into a workable government”).
21 Id (Jackson concurring).
22 Id at 635–38 (Jackson concurring).
23 Id at 635 (Jackson concurring).
24 Youngstown, 343 US at 635 (Jackson concurring).
25 Id at 637 (Jackson concurring).
26 Id (Jackson concurring).
27 Id (Jackson concurring).
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substantive presumption or guide as to the ultimate constitutional outcome,28 Jackson is vague as to how courts should approach Category 2 cases. He notes only that the resolution of
Category 2 cases will “likely [ ] depend on the imperatives of
events and contemporary imponderables rather than on abstract theories of law.”29
Finally, Category 3 involves instances in which “the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied
will of Congress.”30 In Category 3, the president’s “power is at its
lowest ebb,” encompassing “his own constitutional powers minus
any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter.”31 Jackson
instructs that courts, which must “scrutiniz[e] with caution” presidential actions in Category 3, can uphold the president’s actions
“only by disabling the Congress from acting upon the subject,”32
that is, by holding the issue to be within the president’s sole “domain and beyond control by Congress.”33 Jackson deemed
Truman’s steel seizure to be a Category 3 case and accordingly
voted to invalidate the executive order.34
Until 2015, the president had never prevailed in a Category 3
case in the Supreme Court. That changed in Zivotofsky II. The
Court held that the president has the exclusive power to recognize
foreign sovereigns and therefore that the president could defy a
congressional statute that purported to allow a US citizen born in
Jerusalem to have his place of birth listed as “Israel” in his passport.35 Chief Justice John Roberts noted in dissent the unprecedented nature of the president’s Category 3 win, asserting that
“[n]ever before has this Court accepted a President’s direct defiance of an Act of Congress in the field of foreign affairs.”36

28 See Youngstown, 343 US at 637–38 (Jackson concurring). See also Swaine, 83 S
Cal L Rev at 280 (cited in note 18) (“In the judiciary’s hands, at least, Jackson’s categories
serve both a sorting function (identifying which category applies to a given case) and a
standard-setting function (articulating how each set of circumstances should be scrutinized).”) (emphasis omitted).
29 Youngstown, 343 US at 637 (Jackson concurring). See also id at 637 n 3 (Jackson
concurring) (discussing President Abraham Lincoln’s suspension of the writ of habeas corpus at the start of the Civil War and Congress’s later ratification of that action).
30 Id at 637 (Jackson concurring).
31 Id (Jackson concurring).
32 Id at 637–38 (Jackson concurring).
33 Youngstown, 343 US at 640 (Jackson concurring).
34 Id (Jackson concurring).
35 Zivotofsky II, 135 S Ct at 2081, 2096.
36 Id at 2113 (Roberts dissenting).
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Jackson himself recognized in Youngstown that the tripartite
framework was “over-simplified”37—a characterization scholars
and the Court have echoed38—and that it only “roughly” distinguishes the “legal consequences” of the different permutations of
presidential action and congressional approval, silence, and
disapproval.39
Nonetheless, Jackson’s framework for analyzing the constitutionality of presidential actions in areas of claimed concurrent
congressional power has proven to be an enduring and popular
method for evaluating separation-of-powers questions. The
Supreme Court has cited Jackson’s concurrence in dozens of
cases, including in nineteen majority opinions.40 The executive
branch also often relies on Jackson’s opinion. The Office of Legal

37

Youngstown, 343 US at 635 (Jackson concurring).
See, for example, Dames & Moore v Regan, 453 US 654, 669 (1981) (“[I]t is doubtless the case that executive action in any particular instance falls, not neatly in one of
three pigeonholes, but rather at some point along a spectrum running from explicit congressional authorization to explicit congressional prohibition.”); Daniel Bodansky and
Peter Spiro, Executive Agreements+, 49 Vand J Transnatl L 885, 897 (2016) (endorsing the
understanding of the Youngstown framework as a spectrum, rather than an oversimplified
three-category scheme).
39 Youngstown, 343 US at 635 (Jackson concurring).
40 The majority opinions that cite Jackson’s concurrence include: Old Dominion
Branch No 496 v Austin, 418 US 264, 273 n 5 (1974); United States v Nixon, 418 US 683,
707 (1974); Buckley v Valeo, 424 US 1, 122 (1976) (per curiam); Nixon v Administrator of
General Services, 433 US 425, 443 (1977); Chrysler Corp v Brown, 441 US 281, 306 n 37
(1979); Dames & Moore, 453 US at 660–62, 668–69, 674, 678; Bowsher, 478 US 714, 721–
22 (1986); Morrison v Olson, 487 US 654, 694 (1988); Mistretta v United States, 488 US
361, 381, 386, 408 (1989); United States v Munoz-Flores, 495 US 385, 394 (1990);
Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority v Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise,
Inc, 501 US 252, 276 n 22 (1991); Barclays Bank PLC v Franchise Tax Board of California,
512 US 298, 329 (1994); Clinton v Jones, 520 US 681, 696–98, 701 n 35 (1997); Loving v
United States, 517 US 748, 756 (1996); Crosby v National Foreign Trade Council, 530 US
363, 375 (2000); American Insurance Association v Garamendi, 539 US 396, 414–15, 427
(2003); Boumediene v Bush, 553 US 723, 742–43 (2008); Medellín v Texas, 552 US 491,
524–25, 527–30 (2008); Zivotofsky II, 135 S Ct at 2083–84, 2087. For other cases in which
Justices cite Jackson’s concurrence in concurrences or dissents, see, for example,
Immigration and Naturalization Service v Chadha, 462 US 919, 962 (1983) (Powell concurring in the judgment); id at 978, 984 (White dissenting); Clinton v City of New York,
524 US 417, 472 (1998) (Breyer dissenting); Hamdi v Rumsfeld, 542 US 507, 552 (2004)
(Souter concurring in part and dissenting in part); id at 562–63 (Scalia dissenting); id at
583–85 (Thomas dissenting); Hamdan v Rumsfeld, 548 US 557, 638 (2006) (Kennedy concurring in part); Free Enterprise Fund v Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, 561
US 477, 519 (2010) (Breyer dissenting); Zivotofsky v Clinton, 566 US 189, 215 (2012)
(“Zivotofsky I”) (Breyer dissenting). The circuit courts have also relied heavily on Jackson’s opinion, citing it in well over one hundred cases as of early 2018.
38
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Counsel (OLC) has cited Jackson’s concurrence in dozens of opinions,41 including to analyze issues like the scope of the treaty
power42 and war powers.43
Many of the separation-of-powers disputes to which the
Youngstown framework applies do not end up before courts due
to problems of standing or justiciability, among others.44 The use
of Youngstown outside the courts—by the executive and
Congress—is at least as important as its use within them, and
more fraught because of the absence of an authoritative decider
to resolve disputes between the branches.45
Reliance on Jackson’s Youngstown concurrence is often coupled with resort to another separate opinion in Youngstown,
namely the concurring opinion by Justice Felix Frankfurter.
Frankfurter’s concurrence emphasized the importance of historical practice to understanding the constitutional separation of
powers. He explained, “[A] systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the knowledge of the Congress and never
before questioned, engaged in by Presidents who have also sworn

41 A search of Westlaw’s “U.S. Attorney General Opinions” database for “Youngstown
/s Jackson” retrieves thirty OLC opinions, as of February 7, 2018, that cite Jackson’s concurring opinion.
42 See, for example, Office of Legal Counsel, Validity of Congressional-Executive
Agreements That Substantially Modify the United States’ Obligations under an Existing
Treaty, 20 Op Off Legal Counsel 389, 395 (Nov 25, 1996) (applying Jackson’s framework
in determining that Congress may authorize the president to modify via executive agreement US obligations under a preexisting treaty); Office of Legal Counsel, Whether
Uruguay Round Agreements Required Ratification as a Treaty, 18 Op Off Legal Counsel
232, 244 (Nov 22, 1994) (relying on Jackson’s framework to conclude that the joint authority of the president plus Congress means that an international agreement need not be
concluded as an Article II treaty).
43 See, for example, Office of Legal Counsel, Deployment of United States Armed
Forces into Haiti, 18 Op Off Legal Counsel 173, 173, 175 (Sept 27, 1994) (relying on
Jackson’s framework to conclude that the president had authority to deploy US military
forces into Haiti).
44 See Jack Goldsmith, Zivotofsky II as Precedent in the Executive Branch, 129 Harv
L Rev 112, 133 (2015) (noting that “[s]eparation-of-powers disputes between the branches
in foreign relations—including direct clashes of the sort at issue in Zivotofsky II—arise all
the time but are rarely adjudicated” due to “the absence of a plaintiff with standing and a
cause of action,” the political question doctrine, and other justiciability problems).
45 See, for example, National Labor Relations Board v Noel Canning, 134 S Ct 2550,
2617 (2014) (Scalia concurring in the judgment) (“It is not every day that we encounter a
proper case or controversy requiring interpretation of the Constitution’s structural provisions. Most of the time, the interpretation of those provisions is left to the political
branches.”); Bodansky and Spiro, 49 Vand J Transnatl L at 919–20 (cited in note 38)
(“Much of the constitutional law of foreign relations has developed through practice outside the courts [because] of the modern judicial tendency to evade engaging the merits of
foreign affairs disputes.”).
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to uphold the Constitution . . . may be treated as a gloss on ‘executive Power’ vested in the President.”46 The Supreme Court itself,47 as well as commentators48 and executive-branch entities,49
have recognized the importance of “historical gloss” in resolving
separation-of-powers questions. Appeals to historical practice
“are particularly common in constitutional controversies implicating foreign relations,”50 likely due to the implicit nature of
many of the constitutional foreign affairs powers. Historical practice is often deployed in particular to argue that one branch has
acquiesced in a claim of power by a coordinate branch.51 Like
Jackson’s concurrence, Frankfurter’s opinion is relied on outside
the courts.52
Evidence from historical practice can complement Jackson’s
tripartite framework. As Professors Curtis Bradley and Trevor
Morrison have explained, “Historical practice is potentially relevant in each of” the three Youngstown categories.53 Historical
practice can shed light on: whether Congress supports or opposes
presidential action, placing it in Categories 1 or 3; whether the
president’s power in a Category 3 case is exclusive, leading to a
presidential victory despite congressional opposition; and how

46

Youngstown, 343 US at 610–11 (Frankfurter concurring).
See, for example, Noel Canning, 134 S Ct at 2560 (“[T]his Court has treated practice as an important interpretive factor even when the nature or longevity of that practice
is subject to dispute, and even when that practice began after the founding era.”); id at
2594 (Scalia concurring in the judgment) (“[W]here a governmental practice has been
open, widespread, and unchallenged since the early days of the Republic, the practice
should guide our interpretation of an ambiguous constitutional provision.”).
48 See, for example, Curtis A. Bradley and Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and
the Separation of Powers, 126 Harv L Rev 411, 412–13 (2012) (highlighting that “[a]rguments based on historical practice are a mainstay of debates about the constitutional separation of powers” and “are especially common in debates over the distribution of authority
between Congress and the executive branch”). See also Curtis A. Bradley and Trevor W.
Morrison, Presidential Power, Historical Practice, and Legal Constraint, 113 Colum L Rev
1097, 1108–09 & nn 45–47 (2013) (collecting scholarly uses of historical practice).
49 See, for example, Bradley and Morrison, 113 Colum L Rev at 1105–07 (cited in
note 48) (discussing the prominent role that historical practice has played in opinions
issued by OLC).
50 Bradley and Morrison, 126 Harv L Rev at 420 (cited in note 48).
51 See id at 414 (arguing that acquiescence is “[t]he most common reason” for invocation of historical practice in separation-of-powers cases).
52 A search of Westlaw’s “U.S. Attorney General Opinions” database for “Youngstown
/s Frankfurter” retrieves ten OLC opinions, as of February 7, 2018, that cite Frankfurter’s
concurrence. See, for example, see Office of Legal Counsel, Authority to Use Military Force
in Libya *7 (Apr 1, 2011), archived at http://perma.cc/B9R5-L5YN (discussing “historical
gloss” in the context of war powers).
53 Bradley and Morrison, 113 Colum L Rev at 1105 (cited in note 48).
47
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power is allocated in areas of shared authority but congressional
silence, that is, in Category 2.54
The challenge with both Youngstown opinions is that they
were written for and have since been applied primarily in instances in which presidential actions are at issue. But the president is not the only actor challenging the separation of powers.
Increasingly, Congress and even the judiciary are conducting foreign relations, as detailed in the next Part.
II. NONEXECUTIVE CONDUCT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS
Nonexecutive conduct of foreign relations (or “nonexecutive
foreign relations” for short) requires a nonexecutive branch—the
courts or Congress—to engage in or take actions that result in the
opening of a channel of direct communications with a foreign executive branch. Nonexecutive foreign relations captures communications to and from foreign governments that are undertaken
or purport to be undertaken in an official, institutional capacity,
not communications undertaken in a personal (that is, unofficial)
capacity.
The boundaries of what counts as “conduct” of foreign relations may change depending on the circumstances. One possible
definition of actions that should be considered “conduct” of foreign
relations would be actions by a constitutionally significant majority of a nonexecutive branch—for example, a majority of a court,
a majority of both houses of Congress, or a supermajority of the
Senate as required to ratify a treaty.55 In some circumstances,
however, the actions of a constitutionally significant minority
might be relevant. Consider, for example, communications to a
foreign government by a minority of senators, but a minority sufficient to block ratification of a treaty (that is, at least thirty-four).
In other circumstances, the actions of even a single congressperson or judge could be sufficient to constitute the conduct of foreign
relations. One district judge could accept a filing by a foreign government. One senator’s statements could interfere with treaty negotiations or adversely affect relations with a foreign government.
The potential relevance of the actions of a single individual should
not be surprising. Much of US foreign relations is conducted by

54

See id at 1105; Bradley and Morrison, 126 Harv L Rev at 419–20 (cited in note 48).
US Const Art II, § 2, cl 2 (explaining that the president “shall have Power, by and
with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the
Senators present concur”).
55
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individual executive-branch officials (albeit with significant support from staff and others in the executive branch). The United
States deploys one ambassador to each country, plus a number of
subject-matter-specific ambassadors to international gatherings
and institutions.
Whether the actions of less than a constitutionally significant
majority of a nonexecutive branch constitute the conduct of foreign relations will be a fact-specific inquiry. Relevant factors
could include the perception of the foreign government involved:
Would that government be likely to believe that the conduct is
significant? Another factor could be to consider a substitution effect. If the nonexecutive official’s or officials’ actions effectively
substitute for an action that could be or has previously been done
by the executive, then the nonexecutive’s action constitutes conduct of foreign relations.
Nonexecutive foreign relations provides examples of diagonal
transnational networks—that is, transnational networks between one country’s executive branch and another country’s legislature or judiciary.56 The existence of transnational networks
among government officials has garnered significant attention in
recent years.57 Scholars like Anne-Marie Slaughter have focused
on the disaggregation of modern states into component parts,
such as judiciaries, legislatures, and regulatory agencies that engage with their counterparts abroad.58 But while existing scholarship has focused primarily on “[h]orizontal government networks”
56 See Kristen E. Eichensehr, Foreign Sovereigns as Friends of the Court, 102 Va L
Rev 289, 291–92 (2016) (coining the term “diagonal” to describe transnational networks
between foreign executive branches and the US judiciary, specifically in the context of
foreign sovereign amicus briefs filed with the Supreme Court). See also Peter J. Spiro,
Globalization and the (Foreign Affairs) Constitution, 63 Ohio St L J 649, 722–23 (2002)
(noting, in discussing disaggregation of national governments, that the participation of
foreign governments in foreign relations cases is “becoming routine”); Zachary D. Clopton,
Diagonal Public Enforcement, 70 Stan L Rev *5 (forthcoming 2018), archived at
http://perma.cc/8W6Q-KQ8H (adopting the “diagonal” idea to describe “diagonal public enforcement” in which foreign executive branches use US courts to enforce US law).
57 See, for example, Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World Order 31 (Princeton 2004)
(arguing that as the state “disaggregat[es],” “[i]ts component institutions—regulators,
judges, and even legislators—are all reaching out beyond national borders” and “creat[ing]
horizontal networks” with their foreign counterparts). See also generally, for example, Kal
Raustiala, The Architecture of International Cooperation: Transgovernmental Networks
and the Future of International Law, 43 Va J Intl L 1 (2002) (discussing the rise and import
of transnational regulatory networks).
58 See Slaughter, A New World Order at 12 (cited in note 57) (discussing the idea of
the “disaggregated state” as “the rising need for and capacity of different domestic government institutions to engage in activities beyond their borders, often with their foreign
counterparts,” and identifying examples including “regulators pursuing the subjects of
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“link[ing] [ ] counterpart national officials across borders”—judge
to judge, legislature to legislature, regulator to regulator59—nonexecutive foreign relations involves diagonal networks running
from the US judiciary or legislature to foreign governments’ executive branches.60 These diagonal transgovernmental interactions
raise different issues from the horizontal governmental networks
and pose serious questions for the US constitutional system and
the conduct of US foreign relations.61
The next Section uses examples to develop a typology of nonexecutive foreign relations.
A.

A Typology of Nonexecutive Conduct of Foreign Relations

Nonexecutive foreign relations can be inbound or outbound.
Inbound instances involve Congress or the courts receiving communications from foreign executives, whereas outbound instances involve US nonexecutive branches transmitting communications directly to foreign governments. Some examples of
nonexecutive foreign relations involve aspects of both inbound
and outbound. For example, Speaker Boehner’s invitation to
Prime Minister Netanyahu was an outbound communication that
solicited an inbound communication—Netanyahu’s address to
Congress.
Both inbound and outbound nonexecutive foreign relations
have constitutional implications. The Constitution affords the
president the power to conduct both outbound foreign relations by
appointing ambassadors “by and with the Advice and Consent of
the Senate”62 and inbound foreign relations by “receiv[ing] Ambassadors and other public Ministers.”63 The Supreme Court’s

their regulations across borders; judges negotiating minitreaties with their foreign brethren to resolve complex transnational cases; and legislators consulting on the best ways to
frame and pass legislation affecting human rights or the environment”).
59 Id at 13. See also id at 19 (“The structural core of a disaggregated world order is a
set of horizontal networks among national government officials in their respective issue
areas, ranging from central banking through antitrust regulation and environmental protection to law enforcement and human rights protection.”); id at 13–14 (contemplating
“vertical government networks, those between national government officials and their supranational counterparts,” such as the relationship between national courts in Europe and
the European Court of Justice).
60 See Eichensehr, 102 Va L Rev at 291–92 (cited in note 56) (originating the idea of
diagonal transnational networks).
61 See Part III.
62 US Const Art II, § 2, cl 2.
63 US Const Art II, § 3.
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Zivotofsky II opinion cites the president’s powers as to both inbound and outbound foreign relations to support its conclusion
that “Congress . . . has no constitutional power that would enable
it to initiate diplomatic relations with a foreign nation.”64 The
Court in United States v Curtiss-Wright Export Corp65 put the
point even more bluntly, stating that “the President alone has the
power to speak or listen as a representative of the nation.”66
As the examples in this Section show, however, there are in
fact both multiple speakers and multiple listeners when it comes
to the US government’s interactions with foreign governments.67
The converse Youngstown framework set out in the next Part will
explore which nonexecutive foreign relations scenarios, with their
multiplication of speakers and listeners, are constitutionally permissible and which are constitutionally problematic.
1. Inbound.
The most basic example of inbound nonexecutive foreign relations occurs with respect to courts. The judiciary routinely receives filings from foreign sovereigns that are plaintiffs or defendants in cases before the courts.68 The Supreme Court has noted
the “long-settled general rule” that “a foreign nation is generally
entitled to prosecute any civil claim in the courts of the United

64

Zivotofsky II, 135 S Ct at 2086.
299 US 304 (1936).
66 Id at 319. See also Transcript of Oral Argument, Zivotofsky v Kerry, Docket No 13628, *21 (US Nov 3, 2014) (available on Westlaw at 2014 WL 7661633) (reflecting Justice
Elena Kagan’s statement that “what we usually say about diplomatic communication is
that whatever Congress’s other foreign affairs powers are, the power of diplomatic communication belongs to the President and the President alone; that in that realm we only
speak with one voice”).
67 See Eichensehr, 102 Va L Rev at 301 (cited in note 56) (“Although the Court has
repeatedly stated that the United States must speak with ‘one voice’ in foreign relations—
the President’s voice—its acceptance of foreign sovereign amicus briefs makes clear that
there are multiple listeners in the U.S. government.”) (citation omitted).
68 See Hannah L. Buxbaum, Foreign Governments as Plaintiffs in U.S. Courts and
the Case against “Judicial Imperialism,” 73 Wash & Lee L Rev 653, 666–67 (2016) (describing and creating a typology of claims brought by foreign governments as plaintiffs in
US courts); Clopton, 70 Stan L Rev at *5 (cited in note 56) (discussing one species of claims
brought by foreign governments as plaintiffs). Foreign governments are also frequently
defendants in US courts, and in that posture, their susceptibility to suit is governed by the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act §§ 2(a), 3, 4(a), 5, Pub L No 94-583, 90 Stat 2891, 2891–
98 (1976), codified at 28 USC §§ 1330, 1332(a), 1391(f), 1601–11. Court communications to foreign government parties in such cases could also be considered outbound
nonexecutive foreign relations.
65
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States upon the same basis as a domestic corporation or individual might do.”69 This entitlement is limited to governments that
are “at peace with” and “recognized by the United States,”70 a status that the Court has held to be subject to the executive’s determination.71 In a recent article, Professor Hannah Buxbaum identified nearly “300 claims lodged by foreign sovereigns in U.S.
courts.”72 All of these filings are examples of nonexecutive foreign
relations: communications between a foreign sovereign and a nonexecutive branch of the US government, namely the judiciary.
In addition to filing with US courts when they are parties to
cases, foreign sovereigns also communicate with US courts as
amici curiae. One important example of the Supreme Court as a
nonexecutive foreign relations actor stems from the Court’s instigation of a shift in the filing practices of foreign governments.73
Prior to 1978, foreign governments that wished to provide their
views to the Supreme Court about pending cases in which they
were not parties sometimes filed amicus briefs directly with the
Court but more often transmitted diplomatic notes to the State
Department, which passed the notes to the solicitor general who
then filed them with the Court.74 In a 1978 case, however, the
diplomatic-note practice caused concern at oral argument. Zenith
Radio Corp v United States75 raised issues about international
trade, and the United States, which was the respondent, transmitted diplomatic notes from the European Commission and
Japan, which supported the petitioner.76
The State Department’s Digest of United States Practice in
International Law chronicles the Supreme Court’s action and the
Justice and State Departments’ responses.77 In a letter to State
Department Legal Adviser Herbert Hansell, Solicitor General
Wade H. McCree explained that the Clerk of the Supreme Court
wrote to McCree “stating that the procedure of transmitting diplomatic notes to the Court is not authorized by the Court’s rules,”
69

Pfizer, Inc v India, 434 US 308, 318–19 (1978).
Id at 319–20.
71 Id at 320 (“[I]t is within the exclusive power of the Executive Branch to determine
which nations are entitled to sue.”).
72 Buxbaum, 73 Wash & Lee L Rev at 656 (cited in note 68).
73 For a more extensive treatment of foreign sovereign amici, see generally
Eichensehr, 102 Va L Rev 289 (cited in note 56).
74 Id at 297–98.
75 437 US 443 (1978).
76 See Marian Lloyd Nash, Digest of United States Practice in International Law
1978 561 (US Department of State 1980).
77 Id at 560–63.
70
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and that “foreign governments ordinarily should make their
presentations to the Supreme Court in a way authorized by the
Court’s rules.”78 McCree noted that the Japanese diplomatic note
“became a subject of concern” during oral argument in Zenith
Radio, and he concluded:
[T]he fact that the note was provided to the Court by us [the
United States] as a litigant in the case tended to confuse the
presentation of the issues in a way that did not improve the
prospect that the final decision would be favorable to the interests of the Government of Japan.79
McCree therefore suggested that the State Department “discourage foreign governments from presenting diplomatic notes to the
Department of State with requests that the notes be transmitted
to the Supreme Court” and instead “request foreign governments
to communicate their views to the judicial branch through the
more effective method preferred by that branch—the filing of formal briefs.”80
In a circular diplomatic note transmitted to embassies in
Washington, the State Department informed foreign governments of the Supreme Court clerk’s letter to the solicitor general
and explained that the State Department would “no longer transmit diplomatic notes submitted to it by foreign governments with
respect to cases pending in the Supreme Court” or federal courts
of appeals.81 The State Department noted that the Supreme Court
rules permit “any person to file a brief as amicus curiae with the
consent of the parties to the case, or by motion in the absence of
such consent” and that the courts of appeals have a similar rule.82
The United States further precommitted that it would consent to
the filing of a foreign sovereign amicus brief in any case in which
it is a party, and noted that even if the other party refused consent, the Court would “almost certainly grant the motion of a foreign government for leave to file a brief.”83

78 Id at 561 (reproducing Letter from Wade H. McCree, Solicitor General of the United
States, to Herbert J. Hansell, Legal Adviser of the Department of State, May 2, 1978).
79 Id.
80 Nash, Digest of United States Practice at 561 (cited in note 76).
81 Id at 560.
82 Id.
83 Id.

628

The University of Chicago Law Review

[85:609

The State Department also began declining foreign governments’ requests to convey to courts the foreign governments’ intent not to file in particular cases.84 The Digest notes that the
State Department’s decision to decline to transmit Canada’s decision not to file in a district-court case
reflected a growing consensus within the U.S. Government
that from a standpoint of international, as well as domestic,
law, there was no reason why foreign governments should not
in most cases present their views . . . to the courts in the
United States directly rather than through the diplomatic
channel.85
The Supreme Court instigated a change in how foreign governments communicate with the US judicial branch. Before the
Supreme Court clerk’s letter to the solicitor general, foreign government amicus briefs were not unprecedented, but after the letter and the State Department’s diplomatic note, they became the
exclusive way in which foreign governments present their views
to US courts.86 The Supreme Court effected this change indirectly.
The Court did not itself directly communicate with foreign governments; rather, it simply communicated to the Department of
Justice that the department’s own filing of the diplomatic notes
was not in compliance with the Court’s rules.87 It appears from
the solicitor general’s portrayal of the events that it was the solicitor general who closed the loop between the Court’s letter—
stating that the filing of diplomatic notes was not authorized by
the Court’s rules—and the filing of amicus briefs as a way for foreign governments to comply with the Court’s rules.88 And the executive branch went further than the Court suggested. The State
Department declared that the executive branch would no longer
transmit foreign governments’ views to either the Supreme Court

84 Nash, Digest of United States Practice at 561–62 (cited in note 76) (explaining that
in June 1978—after the solicitor general’s letter to the Legal Adviser had been received,
but before the State Department communicated its new policy to the embassies—the State
Department declined to relay Canada’s decision not to file in a particular case to the US
District Court for the Southern District of New York).
85 Id at 562 (emphasis added).
86 See Eichensehr, 102 Va L Rev at 298–302 (cited in note 56).
87 See Nash, Digest of United States Practice at 561 (cited in note 76). This account
corresponds to the way the solicitor general recounts the letter from the Supreme Court
clerk in his letter to the State Department Legal Adviser. The Digest does not provide the
text of the Supreme Court clerk’s letter. See id.
88 See id.
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or the federal courts of appeals,89 nor would the executive transmit
foreign governments’ decisions not to file.90 The State Department
later extended the nontransmittal policy to federal district courts
and to state courts, though maintaining that it would review such
requests “on a case-by-case basis.”91
In sum, the Supreme Court instigated the shift in practice
from diplomatic notes to amicus briefs, thereby broadening a direct, unmediated line of communication between foreign executives and the US judiciary, but the US executive branch consented to and widened the scope of the communications channel
by declining to transmit foreign governments’ views to any US
court. As I explored in detail in a prior article,92 federal courts
today routinely engage in inbound nonexecutive foreign relations
by receiving foreign governments’ amicus briefs in addition to receiving filings by foreign sovereigns as parties.
2. Mixed inbound/outbound.
On January 21, 2015, Boehner invited Netanyahu to address
a joint meeting of Congress about ongoing negotiations regarding
Iran’s nuclear program.93 Foreign heads of state addressing
Congress is not unusual.94 But the invitation to Netanyahu was
unprecedented because it was not coordinated with the executive
branch.95 Boehner admitted that he deliberately failed to notify
89

Id at 560.
Id at 561–62.
91 Marian L. Nash, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to
International Law, 73 Am J Intl L 669, 678–79 (1979). See also Société Nationale
Industrielle Aérospatiale v United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa,
482 US 522, 554 n 5 (1987) (Blackmun concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting
in 1987 that the State Department “in general does not transmit diplomatic notes from
foreign governments to state or federal trial courts”).
92 See generally Eichensehr, 102 Va L Rev 289 (cited in note 56).
93 Letter from John A. Boehner, Speaker, House of Representatives, to Benjamin
Netanyahu, Prime Minister of Israel (Jan 21, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/F3J9
-UY2Q. See also Speaker Boehner Invites Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu to Address
Congress (Speaker Boehner’s Press Office, Jan 21, 2015), archived at
http://perma.cc/ZK4L-SLTL.
94 See Joint Meeting & Joint Session Addresses before Congress by Foreign Leaders
& Dignitaries (US House of Representatives, Sept 26, 2017), archived at
http://perma.cc/FUB6-TD2P (providing a list of foreign leaders and dignitaries who have
addressed Congress).
95 See Elizabeth A. Cobbs, Why Boehner’s Invite to Netanyahu Is Unconstitutional
(Reuters, Mar 2, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/WCE3-M23D (“Boehner’s decision to
invite a foreign head of government to address Congress without first consulting the sitting president has no precedent in American history.”); David Nakamura, Sean Sullivan,
and David A. Fahrenthold, Republicans Invite Netanyahu to Address Congress as Part of
90
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the White House of the invitation in order to “‘make sure there
was no interference’ from the administration,”96 and he asserted
that “Congress ‘can make this decision on its own.’” 97 For its part,
the White House noted that it learned of the invitation only
shortly before Boehner publicly announced it, and that the invitation was a “departure” from “typical protocol.”98 The White
House further announced that President Barack Obama would
not meet with Netanyahu, who faced an election in mid-March,
because of a “long-standing practice and principle” of not meeting
with “heads of state or candidates in close proximity to their elections, so as to avoid the appearance of influencing a democratic
election in a foreign country.”99
Boehner issued the invitation against the backdrop of contentious negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program. In his State of the
Union address in January, Obama called on Congress to refrain
from imposing additional sanctions on Iran while the United
States and other powers negotiated a framework agreement with
Iran to halt its nuclear program.100 Congressional Republicans
and Netanyahu opposed the negotiations.101 The day he issued the
invitation, Boehner reportedly told Republican lawmakers,
“Obama ‘expects us to stand idly by and do nothing while he cuts

Spurning of Obama (Wash Post, Jan 21, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/5XT6-UT3A
(explaining that the Netanyahu invitation “was a departure from normal procedure, in
which the executive branch—and not a legislative leader—would coordinate the visit of a
head of state”).
96 Nick Gass, Boehner Defends Netanyahu Invitation (Politico, Feb 15, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/9U9R-LCHC (quoting House Speaker John Boehner).
97 Nakamura, Sullivan, and Fahrenthold, Republicans Invite Netanyahu (cited in
note 95) (quoting Speaker Boehner). See also Background on Invitation to Prime Minister
Netanyahu (Speaker John Boehner, Jan 28, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/N9MM
-C9QB (“As Speaker Boehner has said, the Congress is a separate and co-equal branch of
government. It was the Speaker’s right to invite the Prime Minister of Israel.”).
98 Press Gaggle aboard Air Force One En Route Boise, Idaho (White House Office of
the Press Secretary, Jan 21, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/42G2-ZK7S (quoting White
House Press Secretary Joshua Earnest).
99 Krishnadev Calamur, Citing Proximity of Israeli Election, Obama Won’t Meet with
Netanyahu
(NPR,
Jan
22,
2015),
online
at
http://www.npr.org/sections/
thetwo-way/2015/01/22/379095373/israels-netanyahu-accepts-invitation-to-address
-congress (visited Feb 7, 2018) (Perma archive unavailable) (quoting White House spokeswoman Bernadette Meehan).
100 Remarks by the President in State of the Union Address (White Office of the Press
Secretary, Jan 20, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/FU6H-KGQP.
101 See Lisa Mascaro and Kathleen Hennessey, White House Says Boehner Broke
Protocol with Netanyahu Invitation (LA Times, Jan 21, 2015), archived at
http://perma.cc/EWE4-YJNP (noting that Netanyahu had “repeatedly warned against easing sanctions against Iran and supported adopting a tougher approach”).

2018]

Courts, Congress, and the Conduct of Foreign Relations

631

a bad deal with Iran . . . . Two words: Hell no!’” 102 Netanyahu,
having accepted Boehner’s invitation, addressed Congress on
March 3 and argued strenuously against the negotiations with
Iran.103
The invitation and Netanyahu’s subsequent speech appear to
have been aimed at influencing US policy and public opinion with
respect to negotiating with or sanctioning Iran.104 Boehner explained in an interview that:
[W]hen it comes to the threat of Iran having a nuclear
weapon—these are important messages that the Congress
needs to hear and the American people need to hear. And I
believe that Prime Minister Netanyahu is the perfect person
to deliver the message of how serious this threat is.105
He also claimed, however, that he was “trying to . . . strengthen
the president’s hand” in the negotiations with Iran, presumably
by threatening sanctions.106 Despite opposition from congressional Republicans and Netanyahu, the United States and Iran,
along with China, France, Germany, Russia, the United
Kingdom, and the European Union, reached agreement in July
2015 on a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action to limit Iran’s nuclear capabilities in exchange for the lifting of sanctions.107
Boehner’s invitation to Netanyahu sparked debate among legal commentators about whether Boehner’s actions complied with
the Constitution. Some argued that the invitation was unconstitutional because Article II, § 3 of the Constitution gives the
president the exclusive power to “receive Ambassadors and other

102 Nakamura, Sullivan, and Fahrenthold, Republicans Invite Netanyahu (cited in
note 95) (quotation marks omitted).
103 See The Complete Transcript of Netanyahu’s Address to Congress (Wash Post, Mar
3, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/662H-DZFR (arguing that the deal “doesn’t block
Iran’s path to the bomb; it paves Iran’s path to the bomb”).
104 See note 257 and accompanying text.
105 Rep. John Boehner Sounds Off on Fight over Homeland Security Funding;
Alabama Chief Justice Roy Moore Explains Stance on Same-Sex Marriage (Fox News, Feb
15, 2015), online at http://www.foxnews.com/transcript/2015/02/15/rep-john-boehner
-sounds-fight-over-homeland-security-funding-alabama-chief-justice-roy (visited Feb 7,
2018) (Perma archive unavailable).
106 Id.
107 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (US Department of State), archived at
http://perma.cc/FT2Z-P4CG. See also Michael R. Gordon and David E. Sanger, World
Leaders Strike Agreement with Iran to Curb Nuclear Ability and Lift Sanctions, NY Times
A1 (July 15, 2015) (explaining the elements of the deal).
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public Ministers.”108 Others argued in favor of the invitation’s constitutionality on a variety of grounds. Some pointed to the evolution of less formal communications between congressmen and foreign governments to argue that constitutional practice supports
the constitutionality of the invitation.109 Others argued that the
president’s failure to exercise his constitutional power to bar
Netanyahu’s entry into the United States constituted implied
consent to the address to Congress.110 Another commentator suggested that the invitation was constitutional because it did not
interfere with the president’s power to receive ambassadors and
because “[h]earing from foreign leaders . . . can support” congressional powers, such as appropriating funds for foreign policy and
ratifying treaties.111
As these arguments reveal, commentators not only disagreed
as to the ultimate constitutionality of the invitation, but also as
to the appropriate framework with which to evaluate it. Part of
the divergence stems from the fact that the Netanyahu incident
has aspects of both inbound and outbound nonexecutive foreign
relations. Boehner’s initial invitation letter to Netanyahu was
outbound—a direct communication to a foreign head of state from
the legislative branch. Netanyahu’s acceptance and ultimate
speech to Congress, on the other hand, were inbound—direct communication from a foreign executive to a nonexecutive branch of
the US government (here, Congress). Some of the dispute over the
incident’s constitutionality involves dueling claims about authority to conduct foreign relations versus Congress’s authority to receive information pertinent to fulfilling its functions.

108 US Const Art II, § 3. See also Michael Ramsey, Is Netanyahu’s Address to Congress
Unconstitutional? (Originalism Blog, Jan 25, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/D6YP
-678V; David Bernstein, Is Netanyahu’s Address to Congress Unconstitutional? (Wash
Post, Jan 25, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/CX96-VWT7.
109 See, for example, Peter Spiro, More on Boehner’s Netanyahu Invite (and What It
Says about Constitutional Change) (Opinio Juris, Jan 27, 2015), archived at
http://perma.cc/4QPF-3PW5; Ryan Scoville, Boehner Invites Bibi: A Closer Look at
Historical Practice (Just Security, Jan 27, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/U89W-FSVV
(noting a long-standing practice of “legislative diplomacy” without taking a position on
whether the differences in the Netanyahu invitation are “material in a constitutional
sense”).
110 See, for example, Seth Barrett Tillman, A Response on Netanyahu’s Address to
Congress (Originalism Blog, Jan 26, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/3M6F-R4VU;
Gerard Magliocca, Netanyahu’s Address to a Joint Session Is Not Unconstitutional
(Concurring Opinions, Jan 26, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/S744-R4PH.
111 Adam J. White, The Constitution Doesn’t Let President Close Congress’s Doors to
Israel (Weekly Standard, Jan 26, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/R4RB-K6AA.
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A more routine example of mixed inbound/outbound nonexecutive foreign relations is congressional travel abroad.112 As
Professor Ryan Scoville has documented, congressmen frequently
visit foreign countries to inform themselves about issues related to their legislative responsibilities.113 Such trips are
mixed inbound/outbound because in meetings with foreign government representatives, congressmen receive information and
gather facts (inbound), but may also communicate messages (outbound). The executive branch often supports congressional travel
abroad.114
Sometimes, however, congressional travel proves controversial. In 2007, then–Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi, a
Democrat from California, met with Syrian President Bashar
al-Assad and discussed a variety of regional security issues.115
President George W. Bush criticized Pelosi’s visit on the ground
that it “sen[t] mixed signals”116 at a time when the Bush administration was trying to isolate Syria diplomatically.117
More recently, in January 2017, Representative Tulsi
Gabbard, a Democrat from Hawaii, traveled to Syria on a “factfinding trip” and met with al-Assad.118 Gabbard had “called for the
[Obama] administration to abandon all assistance to armed

112

See note 184 and accompanying text.
See Scoville, 112 Mich L Rev at 339–49 (cited in note 10). For examples of foreign
travel by congresspersons, see Foreign Travel Reports (Office of the Clerk, US House of
Representatives), archived at http://perma.cc/QW72-QDRY (providing a searchable database of congressional foreign travel expenditures). Foreign travel reports are also published in the Congressional Record. See, for example, Foreign Travel Financial Reports,
115th Cong, 1st Sess, in 163 Cong Rec S 752–61 (daily ed Feb 6, 2017).
114 See note 184 and accompanying text.
115 See Hassan M. Fattah and Graham Bowley, Pelosi Meets with Syrian Leader (NY
Times,
Apr
4,
2007),
online
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/04/world/
middleeast/04cnd-pelosi.html (visited Feb 7, 2018) (Perma archive unavailable) (describing the issues discussed in the meeting).
116 President Bush Makes Remarks on the Emergency Supplemental (White House
Office of the Press Secretary, Apr 3, 2007), archived at http://perma.cc/T86Q-5VMX.
117 See David Stout and Hassan M. Fattah, Bush Assails Pelosi’s Trip to Syria (NY
Times, Apr 3, 2007), online at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/03/world/americas/
03iht-pelosi.4.5130701.html (visited Feb 7, 2018) (Perma archive unavailable); Fattah and
Bowley, Pelosi Meets with Syrian Leader (cited in note 115) (noting that several
Republican congressmen had also met with al-Assad, but that Bush did not mention them
in criticizing Pelosi’s meeting).
118 Congresswoman Tulsi Gabbard Returns from Syria with Renewed Calls: End
Regime Change War in Syria Now (Congresswoman Tulsi Gabbard, Jan 25, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/SJ4U-UEFW. See also Tulsi Gabbard’s Syria Meeting with Assad
Sparks Outcry (BBC, Jan 27, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/B6F6-ZE4Q.
113
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groups and stop seeking Assad’s overthrow,”119 and fellow congressmen criticized her meeting with Assad.120 Although the
Defense Department was aware of Gabbard’s trip,121 neither
Obama nor Trump administration officials commented on it.122
Another possible, although so far hypothetical, example of
mixed inbound/outbound nonexecutive foreign relations could
come from the Supreme Court. The Court routinely “calls for the
views of the solicitor general” (CVSGs), essentially inviting the
executive branch to file a brief expressing its views on whether
the Court should grant certiorari in a case or on which way the
Court should rule on the merits.123 The Court occasionally calls
for the views of parties other than the solicitor general. For example, the Court has called for the views of the houses of Congress
and states, among others.124 As the Court becomes increasingly
accustomed to amicus briefs from foreign sovereigns, it might call
for the views of a specific foreign government or governments in
a future case in which the foreign sovereign’s views would be particularly material to the Court’s consideration. For example, in a
case about extraterritorial application of US law—an issue on
which the Court has been especially solicitous of foreign governments’ briefs125—the Court might request the views of governments whose domestic enforcement efforts would be impacted by
application of US law abroad. Such an action by the Court would
be analogous in form to the Netanyahu invitation: an invitation
from a nonexecutive branch (outbound) for a foreign executive
branch to provide its views to the Court (inbound). What the
Court scenario would lack, of course, is the literal receiving of a

119 Karen DeYoung, Rep. Tulsi Gabbard Makes Unannounced Trip to Syria (Wash
Post, Jan 18, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/76A4-GXF3.
120 See Mike Lillis, Gabbard Meeting with Assad Draws Disgust from Fellow
Lawmakers (The Hill, Jan 26, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/EU7B-PK2X (collecting
comments).
121 See id (quoting a Defense Department spokesman).
122 See Ryan Scoville, A Legal Analysis of Rep. Tulsi Gabbard’s Trip to Syria
(Lawfare, Feb 14, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/2DZ9-C286 (arguing that the executive branch may have “quietly endorsed the trip: The Pentagon knew about it in advance,
and yet there’s no public evidence of an objection”).
123 See Neal Devins and Saikrishna B. Prakash, Reverse Advisory Opinions, 80 U Chi
L Rev 859, 881–83 (2013) (detailing the frequency with which the Court requests the views
of the solicitor general and the solicitor general’s perceived duty to respond).
124 Id at 883–84.
125 See, for example, Morrison v National Australia Bank Ltd, 561 US 247, 269–70
(2010) (discussing amicus briefs filed by the United Kingdom, Australia, and France complaining that extraterritorial application of US securities laws interferes with their securities regulations, and explaining that the Court’s test will avoid such interference).
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foreign ambassador, and the Court’s request would also occur in
the shadow of the executive branch’s own precommitment to consent to the filing of any foreign sovereign amicus brief.126
3. Outbound.
The Iran nuclear deal negotiations sparked another example
of nonexecutive conduct of foreign relations by Congress, specifically an outbound example.127 On March 9, 2015, forty-seven
Republican senators, led by Senator Cotton, released an “Open
Letter to the Leaders of the Islamic Republic of Iran.”128 The letter
began by noting that the Iranian leaders “may not fully understand our constitutional system.”129 It then warned that the senators would regard an agreement “not approved by the Congress
as nothing more than an executive agreement between President
126

See note 83 and accompanying text.
Instances of outbound nonexecutive foreign relations frequently raise questions
about the Logan Act. See Logan Act, 1 Stat 613, 613 (1799), codified at 18 USC § 953:
127

Any citizen of the United States, wherever he may be, who, without authority of
the United States, directly or indirectly commences or carries on any correspondence or intercourse with any foreign government or any officer or agent thereof,
with intent to influence the measures or conduct of any foreign government or
of any officer or agent thereof, in relation to any disputes or controversies with
the United States, or to defeat the measures of the United States, shall be fined
under this title or imprisoned not more than three years, or both.
See also Steve Vladeck, The Iran Letter and the Logan Act (Lawfare, Mar 10, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/N26B-EY3U (arguing that there are significant legal and political obstacles to prosecution of the Cotton letter signatories under the Logan Act); Peter
Spiro, GOP Iran Letter Might Be Unconstitutional. Is It Also Criminal? (Opinio Juris, Mar
9, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/JNC6-RQE6 (arguing that the Cotton letter meets
the elements of a Logan Act violation). See also Ryan Goodman, Many Think This Law Is
Obsolete. It Could Actually Be a Big Problem for Trump. (Wash Post, Apr 5, 2017), archived
at http://perma.cc/5CD5-UE7S (arguing that despite the lack of convictions under the
Logan Act, it “has been ‘enforced’ and relied upon time and again by the executive branch,”
including to expel “foreign ambassadors . . . for aiding and abetting violations” and to restrict and suspend US passports). The Logan Act, which has not been the basis for a prosecution since 1803, see Vladeck, The Iran Letter (cited in note 127), stretches more broadly
than outbound nonexecutive conduct of foreign relations because it covers any US citizen,
not just legislative or judicial officials. But the Act is also narrower than nonexecutive
foreign relations because it is limited to correspondence intended to influence a foreign
government “in relation to any disputes or controversies with the United States” or “to
defeat the measures of the United States,” whereas outbound nonexecutive conduct of foreign relations is not so limited. 18 USC § 953. However, the two could interact if, for example, debates about the constitutionality of instances of nonexecutive foreign relations
were taken to shape the interpretation of “without authority of the United States” in the
text of the Logan Act. Id.
128 Tom Cotton, et al, Open Letter to the Leaders of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Mar
9, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/KZ73-5UX7.
129 Id.
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Obama and Ayatollah Khamenei” that could be revoked by the
next president or modified by Congress.130 After releasing the letter, Cotton took the extraordinary step of tweeting the letter directly to Iranian leaders, including Ayatollah Khamenei,
President Hassan Rouhani, and Foreign Minister Javad Zarif.131
Zarif responded by tweeting back a link to remarks in which he
responded to the letter, calling it a “propaganda ploy” and “unprecedented in diplomatic history” and arguing that the senators
“do not understand international law.”132
The senators intended the letter to undermine then ongoing
negotiations over the nuclear deal,133 and the White House blasted
their interference. White House Press Secretary Josh Earnest
called the letter “the continuation of a partisan strategy to undermine the President’s ability to conduct foreign policy and advance
our national security interests around the globe,”134 and he noted
that interfering in ongoing negotiations “is not [ ] the role that our
Founding Fathers envisioned for Congress to play when it comes
to foreign policy.”135 Vice President Joe Biden issued a strongly
worded statement declaring that the letter “ignores two centuries
of precedent and threatens to undermine the ability of any future
American President, whether Democrat or Republican, to negotiate with other nations on behalf of the United States.”136 Biden
further highlighted the long history of US international agreements made without Congress’s approval, and noted that in his
thirty-six years in the Senate, he could not “recall another
instance in which Senators wrote directly to advise another

130

Id.
See Megan Specia, Republican Senators’ Open Letter to Iran Sparks Fierce Twitter
Spat (Mashable, Mar 10, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/BC76-S599 (chronicling
tweets).
132 Id (quoting the text of an article containing Zarif’s response).
133 Greg Jaffe and Sean Sullivan, Republican Letter to Iran Intensifies Dispute with
White House (Wash Post, Mar 9, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/X2XT-A9E2 (explaining that the letter was “designed to kill any potential deal”); Peter Baker, G.O.P. Senators’
Letter to Iran about Nuclear Deal Angers White House (NY Times, Mar 9, 2015), online at
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/10/world/asia/white-house-faults-gop-senators-letter-to
-irans-leaders.html (visited Feb 7, 2018) (Perma archive unavailable) (“The letter appeared aimed at unraveling a framework agreement even as negotiators drew close to
reaching it.”).
134 Press Briefing by Press Secretary Josh Earnest, 3/9/2014 [sic] (White House Office
of the Press Secretary, Mar 9, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/GF8Y-VN66.
135 Id.
136 Statement by the Vice President on the March 9 Letter from Republican Senators
to the Islamic Republic of Iran (White House Office of the Vice President, Mar 9, 2015),
archived at http://perma.cc/C7T2-FQBH.
131
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country—much less a longtime foreign adversary—that the
President does not have the constitutional authority to reach a
meaningful understanding with them.”137
Many commentators and media outlets derided the letter on
a variety of grounds.138 Separation-of-powers concerns even made
their way into major newspapers’ editorials. The Los Angeles
Times, for example, argued, “[N]egotiating with foreign nations is
the president’s job. The Republican senators’ meddling in that responsibility is outrageous.”139 The Boston Globe called the letter a
“breathtakingly reckless intrusion into international diplomacy”
that “undercuts the president’s traditional authority to oversee
the shaping of foreign policy.”140
Legal commentators debated similar issues.141 Professor Josh
Chafetz has argued that the Cotton letter is constitutionally protected based on a broad understanding of the Speech and Debate
Clause.142 Professor Julian Ku noted that the letter “could be

137

Id.
For a compilation of negative coverage of the letter, see Josh Earnest, Round-Up:
Editorial Boards from around the Country Respond to the 47 Republican Senators (White
House, Mar 11, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/M93F-GMFQ.
139 Republican Senators Go Nuclear with Missive to Iran (LA Times, Mar 11, 2015),
archived at http://perma.cc/GRA4-ACB2.
140 GOP Letter to Iran Is a Reckless Intrusion into Nuclear Talks (Boston Globe, Mar
10, 2015), online at http://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/editorials/2015/03/10/gop-letter
-iran-was-reckless-intrusion-into-nuclear-talks/ztJVtjcXFo1jBUDz8P03kJ/story.html
(visited Feb 7, 2018) (Perma archive unavailable).
141 Academics also raised additional concerns about the letter. For example, Professor
Jack Goldsmith pointed out that the letter erred in stating that the Senate ratifies treaties, when in fact the Senate votes on a resolution of ratification that, if approved, allows
the president to ratify. Jack Goldsmith, The Error in the Senators’ Letter to the Leaders of
Iran (Lawfare, Mar 9, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/UCP3-9NXK. The letter also
sparked a separate discussion of whether the signatories violated the Logan Act. See
note 127.
142 Josh Chafetz, Congress’s Constitution: Legislative Authority and the Separation of
Powers 229–31 (Yale 2017). Because of the many constitutional powers of Congress that
relate to foreign relations, Chafetz is certainly correct that “we should be deeply skeptical
of any attempt to give the president the sole authority to define, construct, and delimit
American interests or positions on the world stage.” Id at 230. However, Congress’s powers
to help define US interests and shape foreign policy through the confirmation of executivebranch officials, the power of the purse, and voting on treaties, among others, do not necessarily mean that Congress has or should have constitutional sanction to conduct foreign
relations as I and other foreign relations scholars define that term. See note 1 and accompanying text. In stating that “multiple institutions of government—most definitely including the members and houses of Congress—take part in conducting foreign relations,”
Chafetz, Congress’s Constitution at 230 (cited in note 142), Chafetz appears to use a
broader understanding of “conduct,” though he also endorses congressional conduct of foreign relations, narrowly defined. See id at 231 (endorsing the constitutionality of the
Cotton letter and arguing, with approval, that “[b]y purporting to write directly to the
138
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criticized as an unconstitutional interference in the President’s
inherent power to conduct foreign affairs” and “is very unusual.”143 He nonetheless concluded that the letter “skirts, but
manages to avoid, any unconstitutional interference” because it
“does not state U.S. policy” and is instead “[p]hrased merely as a
letter ‘bringing attention’ to the U.S. constitutional system.”144
Professors Robert Howse and Ruti Teitel, on the other hand,
argued that the letter was a “flagrant violation of at least the
spirit” of the principle that “the President is the sole representative of the United States ‘with foreign nations’” and, “in the words
of the Supreme Court, ‘the President alone has the power to
speak’ with other states on America’s behalf.”145 Professor Marty
Lederman similarly noted that the letter “is deeply transgressive
of constitutional values and traditions,” if not of the Constitution
itself.146
As the executive-branch, popular-media, and legal-expert reactions to the Cotton letter reveal, the senators’ direct communication to a foreign government during delicate negotiations and
in an overt attempt to interfere with those negotiations is at
least constitutionally troubling, if not strictly violative of the
Constitution.
The Cotton letter incident shares some similarities with a
historical antecedent. In 1984, ten Democratic congressmen sent
a letter to Nicaragua’s then–Coordinator of the Junta of National
Reconstruction—who later became President—Daniel Ortega
urging him to ensure free and open elections.147 Known as the
“Dear Comandante” letter,148 the missive explained that the
congressional signatories opposed the Reagan administration’s
support of “military action directed against the people or government of Nicaragua,” and argued that if Ortega held free and open
Iranian regime, the signatories to the letter asserted that they were . . . entitled to a seat
at the diplomatic table”).
143 Julian Ku, 47 US Senators Send Iran’s Leader an Unnecessary(?) Primer on
How US Constitution Works (Opinio Juris, Mar 9, 2017), archived at
http://perma.cc/9ETL-EPQZ.
144 Id.
145 Robert Howse and Ruti Teitel, Legal Flaws in the 47 Senators’ Letter to Iran (Just
Security, Mar 10, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/2BGA-J92S, quoting Curtiss-Wright
Export Corp, 299 US at 319.
146 Marty Lederman, The Cotton Letter . . . and the Vice President’s Response (Just
Security, Mar 10, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/Q8LE-PE6F.
147 See Jim Wright, et al, Ten Congressmen Send a Message to Managua, Wall St J
34 (Apr 17, 1984) (reprinting the full text of the letter). See also Steven V. Roberts,
Congress; Letter to Nicaragua: ‘Dear Comandante,’ NY Times A14 (Apr 20, 1984).
148 See, for example, That ‘Dear Comandante’ Letter, Wash Post A20 (May 3, 1984).
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elections, “[t]hose responsible for supporting violence against
your government . . . would have far greater difficulty winning
support for their policies.”149 Newt Gingrich, then a Republican
congressman, condemned the letter, arguing that it “clearly violates the constitutional separation of powers” and “undercut[s]
the [Reagan] Administration’s foreign policy.”150
More than a year later, the Reagan administration’s
Secretary of State George Shultz gave a speech criticizing the letter and trips by congressmen to Nicaragua, arguing that the
Reagan administration “‘cannot conduct a successful policy’ toward Nicaragua when legislators” act as “self-appointed emissaries to the communist regime.” 151 Shultz also noted, however, that
congressmen have the right to travel to and review the situation
in Nicaragua,152 and after meeting with Democratic congressmen
later in the day, he “reversed course,” telling reporters that “any
phrase that might be interpreted as criticism” of the congressmen
“is not a proper interpretation.” 153
B.

Drivers of Nonexecutive Foreign Relations

The phenomenon of nonexecutive conduct of foreign relations
is not new. For decades, foreign governments have filed amicus
briefs, and congressmen have intervened with foreign governments for even longer.154 But the salience of nonexecutive conduct
of foreign relations increased in 2015 with the Netanyahu address
to Congress and the Cotton letter. Some of the drivers discussed
below suggest that although nonexecutive foreign relations have
occurred in the past, they are likely to be more frequent going
forward.
Technology. Technology facilitates communication, and
communications among government actors are no exception.

149

Ten Congressmen Send a Message to Managua, Wall St J at 34 (cited in note 147).
Roberts, Congress; Letter to Nicaragua, NY Times at A14 (cited in note 147).
151 Don Oberdorfer, Shultz Backs Off Attack on Meddling by Congress; Lawmakers
Confront Him about Nicaragua, Wash Post A24 (May 24, 1985).
152 See R. Gregory Nokes, Reagan, Shultz Criticize Congress on Nicaragua;
Lawmakers Don’t Like It (Associated Press, May 24, 1985).
153 Oberdorfer, Shultz Backs Off Attack on Meddling by Congress, Wash Post at A24
(cited in note 151) (quoting Shultz and noting that Shultz “seem[ed] to exonerate the authors of the letter”).
154 See Scoville, 112 Mich L Rev at 351–54 (cited in note 10) (discussing the history of
congressional contacts with foreign governments).
150
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Advanced communications technology is not necessary for nonexecutive foreign relations communications,155 but it does make
communications across borders faster, cheaper, and easier. Scholars have argued that the information technology revolution has
spurred global networks both among government officials and
outside of governments.156 In a study of transgovernmental networks among regulatory agencies, for example, Professor Kal
Raustiala noted that every regulator he interviewed cited “advances in information technologies . . . as a central permissive
cause of the contemporary network phenomenon.”157
In the same way that they enable horizontal governmental
networks, technological advances facilitate diagonal communications between foreign executives and US nonexecutive branches.
New technologies may just replace earlier counterparts in the
way that email can substitute for a mailed letter or a fax machine.
But as Cotton’s tweets to Iranian leaders and the Iranian foreign
minister’s tweeted response reveal,158 new technologies can also
create communication channels that are different in kind from
prior options.
Sophistication about disaggregation. Another driver leading
foreign executive branches to engage the US judiciary and
Congress may be foreign governments’ increasing sophistication
about the relative powers of the branches of the US government.
As foreign executive branches interact directly with parts of the
US government other than the State Department, they may come
to better understand the policy process within the United States
and the policy bottlenecks and power centers. This understanding
may reveal more diverse avenues of engagement than the traditional State Department–foreign ministry route. For example,
Professor Peter Spiro has argued that foreign governments’ “increasing sophistication . . . when it comes to internal U.S. governance structures” has led them to “play the system directly” by
“participat[ing] in U.S. judicial proceedings not just as defendants
155

See notes 166–69 and accompanying text (discussing the Genet episode).
See, for example, Raustiala, 43 Va J Intl Law at 12 (cited in note 57) (“Technological advances provide the means for networks to develop with greater frequency and at
lower cost.”); Melissa A. Waters, Mediating Norms and Identity: The Role of Transnational
Judicial Dialogue in Creating and Enforcing International Law, 93 Georgetown L J 487,
497 (2005) (“The revolution in information technology [ ] has produced a worldwide communications capacity that empowers and energizes loose networks of nongovernmental
organizations and so-called ‘epistemic communities,’ which as a result play an increasingly
important role in shaping the global agenda.”) (citation omitted).
157 Raustiala, 43 Va J Intl Law at 12 (cited in note 57).
158 See notes 131–32 and accompanying text.
156
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(which more likely involves a lack of sophistication) but increasingly as plaintiffs and amici curiae.”159 While existing scholarship
has explored how disaggregation impacts international law and
US compliance with international law,160 this Article takes a different approach, focusing instead on the constitutional implications of foreign governments’ interactions with the disaggregated
pieces of the federal government.
Fractionalization in the United States. Advances in communications technology and increased knowledge among foreign governments about the US system help to create the conditions for
nonexecutive foreign relations, but they do not explain what
causes nonexecutive foreign relations to move from potential to
actual. The trigger for many of the instances of nonexecutive foreign relations discussed above, particularly those undertaken by
Congress, appears to be serious policy disagreements between
government officials of opposing political parties.161
Divided government—when one party controls the presidency and the other party controls Congress—may foster nonexecutive foreign relations. In such a circumstance, the party controlling Congress can use levers of congressional authority, such
as issuing invitations and engaging in foreign travel, to engage in
nonexecutive foreign relations. The Netanyahu invitation and the
Cotton letter are prominent examples: Republican leaders of
Congress used the powers of their offices in an attempt to derail
the foreign policy of a Democratic president.162
159 Spiro, 63 Ohio St L J at 683 (cited in note 56) (citations omitted). See also generally
Buxbaum, 73 Wash & Lee L Rev 653 (cited in note 68) (assessing the claims that foreign
governments bring as plaintiffs in US courts); Eichensehr, 102 Va L Rev 289 (cited in note
56) (analyzing the role of foreign governments as amici curiae).
160 See, for example, Raustiala, 43 Va J Intl Law at 91–92 (cited in note 57) (discussing the impact of transgovernmental networks on international law); Peter J. Spiro,
Disaggregating U.S. Interests in International Law, 67 L & Contemp Probs 195, 196
(Autumn 2004) (exploring how “disaggregated governmental components beyond the traditional foreign policy apparatus[ ] may be developing an institutional interest in the acceptance of” international law).
161 Examples include, among others, Democrat Pelosi’s trip to Syria during the
Republican Bush administration, see notes 115–17 and accompanying text; Republican
Boehner’s invitation to Netanyahu during the Democratic Obama administration, see
notes 93–107 and accompanying text; and the Cotton letter by Republican senators during
the Obama administration, see notes 127–137 and accompanying text.
162 See David E. Pozen, Self-Help and the Separation of Powers, 124 Yale L J 2, 4–12
(2014) (proposing that unilateral executive actions by the Obama administration should
be conceived of as “constitutional self-help”—the use of generally impermissible means
that become permissible because done in response to a prior impermissible act by
Congress). Some commentators have argued that the Netanyahu invitation was a form of
congressional self-help in retaliation for perceived executive unilateralism on other issues
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But divided government is not necessary for nonexecutive
foreign relations to occur. Examples of nonexecutive foreign relations from the courts do not depend on the same political dynamics as executive-legislative divided government. Moreover, even
when a single party controls both the presidency and Congress,
minority legislators may attempt to engage in nonexecutive foreign relations using different tactics than a legislative majority
has at its disposal. In fact, unified government may increase
the odds of nonexecutive conduct of foreign relations by minority legislators: if policy divisions and fractionalization make
working with the executive and legislative majority untenable,
minority legislators may have a greater incentive to engage in
nonexecutive foreign relations through in-person visits abroad or
sending of messages precisely because they lack other mechanisms for affecting policy.
Fractionalization in the US political system incentivizes
not just US actors but also foreign countries to engage in nonexecutive foreign relations. The existence of deep disagreements—if not outright animosity—between US government
branches or majority and minority parties makes it prudent for
foreign governments to attempt to engage multiple actors to understand the full range of views held by those with some potential
to influence US policy, either currently or after the next election
cycle. Fractionalization also creates the possibility that foreign
governments can forum shop. If a foreign government is stymied
by the executive branch, it might find a more receptive audience
in Congress or the courts.163 Netanyahu’s address to Congress, for

or executive resistance to cooperation over inviting Netanyahu. See, for example,
Bernstein, Is Netanyahu’s Address to Congress Unconstitutional? (cited in note 108) (suggesting that Boehner viewed the invitation as self-help based on an interview in which, as
reported by Bernstein, Boehner “suggested that given that President Obama has been
ignoring Congress’ constitutional prerogatives, as by unilaterally rewriting immigration
law, Congress can retaliate by ignoring the president’s constitutional prerogatives”); Josh
Blackman, Gridlock and Congressional Power (Josh Blackman’s Blog, Jan 26, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/9M24-CTUR (citing Boehner’s invitation to Netanyahu as a potential example of self-help per Professor David E. Pozen and noting that “[u]nder normal
circumstances, the President would likely approve of the Speaker wishing to invite the
[Prime Minister] of an ally to address Congress. But we are not living in normal times”).
To the extent that a desire to engage in self-help may describe the instances of nonexecutive foreign relations that I discuss, I consider “self-help” as a descriptive label here,
not one with the normative, justificatory import that Pozen separately proposes.
163 Spiro, 67 L & Contemp Probs at 215 (cited in note 160) (“The United States is no
longer a monolith for purposes of international law and relations; it is now, rather, an
arena in which global forces can play at the game of transnational politics and rational
institutional action.”).
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example, seemed designed precisely to find a friendly audience,
avoiding Obama, with whom Netanyahu had had a troubled relationship,164 and engaging directly with congressional Republicans,
who the prime minister (correctly) believed were more receptive
to his arguments for a tougher approach to Iran.165
Professor Michael Ramsey noted that Netanyahu’s engagement with Congress, perceived to be more aligned with Israeli
policy than the president, echoes an incident from the Founding
era.166 In 1793, French Ambassador Edmond Genet “sought to enlist U.S. support for France in its conflict with Britain,” and when
President George Washington “insisted on neutrality, Genet attempted to communicate directly with Congress, which he suspected was more sympathetic to France.”167 The Washington administration, in a series of letters from Secretary of State
Thomas Jefferson, instructed Genet to communicate only with
the president.168 Jefferson explained, “[B]y our constitution all
foreign agents are to be addressed to the President of the US[,]
no other branch of the government being charged with the foreign communications.”169

164 See, for example, Peter Baker and Jodi Rudoren, Obama and Netanyahu: A Story
of Slights and Crossed Signals (NY Times, Nov 9, 2015), online at http://www
.nytimes.com/2015/11/09/us/politics/obama-and-netanyahu-a-story-of-slights-and-crossed
-signals.html (visited Feb 7, 2018) (Perma archive unavailable) (chronicling tensions between Obama and Netanyahu).
165 See, for example, David E. Sanger, In Reprieve to Obama, Senate Democrats Agree
to Wait on Iran Sanctions (NY Times, Jan 28, 2015), online at http://www
.nytimes.com/2015/01/28/world/middleeast/house-hearing-iran-nuclear-talks-sanctions
.html (visited Feb 7, 2018) (Perma archive unavailable) (chronicling congressional support
for imposing additional sanctions on Iran).
166 Ramsey, Is Netanyahu’s Address to Congress Unconstitutional? (cited in note 108).
167 Id.
168 See Saikrishna B. Prakash and Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power over
Foreign Affairs, 111 Yale L J 231, 321–22 (2001) (recounting the correspondence between
Jefferson and Genet). For a detailed chronology of the disputes accompanying Genet’s tenure as ambassador, see Curtis A. Bradley and Martin S. Flaherty, Executive Power
Essentialism and Foreign Affairs, 102 Mich L Rev 545, 664–76 (2004).
169 Letter from Thomas Jefferson, US Secretary of State, to Edmond Charles Genet,
French Ambassador to the United States (National Archives, Oct 2, 1793), archived at
http://perma.cc/PEM7-F5AP. See also Letter from Thomas Jefferson, US Secretary of
State, to Edmond Charles Genet, French Ambassador to the United States (National
Archives, Nov 22, 1793), archived at http://perma.cc/RWT2-JVPY (deeming the president
to be “the only channel of communication between this country and foreign nations”).
Eventually, Genet’s hijinks prompted the Washington administration to request that
France recall him as ambassador, and some of Jefferson’s reprimands to Genet for attempting to contact Congress occurred after recall was requested, but before France’s decision to recall Genet reached the United States in January 1794. See Bradley and
Flaherty, 102 Mich L Rev at 670–71, 673–74 (cited in note 168).
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As the Genet example illustrates, forum shopping isn’t new,
but the current era of hyperpartisanship and fractionalization
may make it more appealing and more common.
The Trump effect. The Trump administration’s perceived incompetence at and inattention to diplomacy may provide yet another spur for domestic and international actors to seek one another out, circumventing the executive branch.170 Missteps by
Trump, such as failing to affirm the United States’ continued
commitment to NATO171 and proposing deep cuts to the State
Department’s budget,172 have provoked congressional pushback.173
And in at least one instance, a legislator has stepped in directly
to countermand Trump. In a February phone call, “President
Trump blasted Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull over
a refugee agreement and boasted about the magnitude of his electoral college win” before “abruptly end[ing]” the call.174 In an attempt to smooth things over, Senator McCain called Australia’s
ambassador to the United States to “express [ ] unwavering support for the U.S.-Australia alliance.”175

170 See, for example, Morgan Chalfant, Worries Mount about Vacancies in Trump’s
State Department (The Hill, May 21, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/D7H4-5AQV (discussing how the lack of political appointees signals that diplomacy and US alliances are
not a priority for the Trump administration); Eliana Johnson and Michael Crowley, The
Bottleneck in Rex Tillerson’s State Department (Politico, June 4, 2017), archived at
http://perma.cc/XMK2-XC4Y (discussing ongoing State Department vacancies at the politicalappointee level).
171 See Michael D. Shear, Mark Landler, and James Kanter, In NATO Speech, Trump
Is Vague about Mutual Defense Pledge (NY Times, May 25, 2017), online at http://www
.nytimes.com/2017/05/25/world/europe/donald-trump-eu-nato.html (visited Feb 7, 2018)
(Perma archive unavailable) (noting that at his first NATO summit, Trump “declin[ed] to
explicitly endorse NATO’s mutual defense pledge” and instead “lash[ed] out at fellow
members for what he called their ‘chronic underpayments’ to the alliance”).
172 See Carol Morello and Anne Gearan, Senators Sharply Question State Department
Budget Cuts (Wash Post, June 13, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/8B86-JN9T (reporting that Trump’s budget proposed cutting the State Department’s budget by roughly 30
percent).
173 See, for example, The Latest: Senate Jabs Trump in Unanimous Vote on NATO
(Boston Herald, June 15, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/7S7D-ZUUD (reporting that
the Senate voted unanimously in favor of a resolution reaffirming NATO’s mutual defense
commitment); Morello and Gearan, Senators Sharply Question State Department Budget
Cuts (cited in note 172) (reporting on bipartisan criticism of the Trump administration’s
proposed State Department budget cuts, including Republican Senator Lindsey Graham’s
statement that the proposed cuts are “radical and reckless when it comes to soft power”).
174 Miller and Rucker, ‘This Was the Worst Call by Far’ (cited in note 4).
175 Statement by SASC Chairman John McCain (cited in note 4). See also Peter
Baker, Emmarie Huetteman, and Glenn Thrush, McCain Steps In to Ease Tension with
Australia over Trump Insult (NY Times, Feb 2, 2017), online at http://www
.nytimes.com/2017/02/02/us/politics/trump-congress-tax-code.html (visited Feb 7, 2018)
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If the Trump administration continues its combination of diplomatic gaffes and lack of engagement through normal State
Department channels, more congressmen may engage in direct communications with foreign governments, and foreign governments
may increasingly seek out interlocutors among the legislators.176
The likelihood that nonexecutive conduct of foreign relations
will become more frequent makes development of a legal framework to assess its constitutionality all the more crucial. The next
Part takes up that task.
III. THE CONVERSE YOUNGSTOWN FRAMEWORK
While the traditional Youngstown framework provides guidance on how to assess presidential and executive-branch actions,
it does not address the increasingly frequent circumstances in
which the president is cast in a reactive role.177 The converse
Youngstown framework proposed here addresses precisely those
situations in which Congress or the courts are the initial actors
and the executive branch reacts to their initiative. The two
Youngstown frameworks are not mutually exclusive. Many
separation-of-powers disputes are iterative processes wherein, for
example, the president takes an action, Congress reacts, then the
president reacts to Congress’s reaction, and so on. Which framework applies depends on which branch’s action is at issue. Traditional Youngstown applies when the action at issue is the executive’s; converse Youngstown applies when the action at issue is
Congress’s or the judiciary’s.
Many of the situations to which converse Youngstown will apply, like many instances in which traditional Youngstown applies,
will be nonjusticiable and not ultimately resolved or resolvable by
courts.178 The converse Youngstown framework can nonetheless

(Perma archive unavailable) (reporting on McCain’s “remarkable statement” recounting
his call).
176 See, for example, Jennifer Steinhauer, World Leaders Wary of Trump May Have
an Unlikely Ally: Congress (NY Times, June 20, 2017), online at http://www.nytimes
.com/2017/06/19/us/politics/world-leaders-wary-of-trump-may-have-an-ally-congress.html
(visited Feb 7, 2018) (Perma archive unavailable) (detailing numerous actions by Congress
to resist the Trump administration’s foreign policy positions).
177 See Henkin, Foreign Affairs at 95 (cited in note 1) (noting that “[t]he Jackson formula was written from the President’s perspective,” and raising the possibility of “a parallel formulation [that] might address the powers of Congress in relation to those of the
President, and might be somewhat different”).
178 See notes 44–45 and accompanying text. Some circumstances in which converse
Youngstown would apply might in fact be justiciable. For example, imagine a scenario in
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help to guide analysis of separation-of-powers disputes by government officials, such as OLC179 and legislators,180 who are on the
front lines of such debates.181 It will also be useful to scholars focused on the respective powers of the three branches.
The frequent absence of courts as authoritative adjudicators of separation-of-powers disputes does not diminish the
constitutional-law nature of such questions. Although “there is a
strand of British (and, more generally, Commonwealth) constitutional thinking that would limit the term ‘constitutional law’ to
norms that are enforceable by the judiciary,” such a limitation
“does not map well onto U.S. constitutional understandings” and
constitutional-law scholarship.182 Rather, in the United States,
extrajudicial constitutional decisionmaking by the political
branches is accepted and frequent.183
Moreover, judicial decisions remain relevant even for nonjusticiable constitutional questions. When either Youngstown or

which Congress overrides a presidential veto founded on constitutional objections by enacting a statute that conveys rights for or imposes burdens on private parties, who would
then have standing to sue.
179 See, for example, Dawn E. Johnsen, Functional Departmentalism and Nonjudicial
Interpretation: Who Determines Constitutional Meaning?, 67 L & Contemp Probs 105, 113–
14 (Summer 2004) (arguing that “the political branches do engage in principled constitutional interpretation,” and citing Department of Justice legal opinions as an example). See
also notes 41–43 and accompanying text (discussing OLC citations to Jackson’s
Youngstown framework).
180 See Paul Brest, The Conscientious Legislator’s Guide to Constitutional Interpretation, 27 Stan L Rev 585, 587–88 (1975) (arguing that “legislators are obligated to determine, as best they can, the constitutionality of proposed legislation” and that “[t]he modern legislative committee, staffed by lawyers and others having expertise in particular
areas of policy and law, is competent to consider the constitutional implications of pending
measures”).
181 See Johnsen, 67 L & Contemp Probs at 115 (cited in note 179) (arguing that “[t]he
absence of judicial review . . . does not signify the absence of constitutional limits,” but
rather that “[c]onstitutional fidelity . . . often depends on the branches’ effectiveness in
determining their own constitutional obligations and then exercising principled selfrestraint, as well as on the branches’ substantial powers to check each other and on the
ultimate power of the electorate”).
182 Curtis A. Bradley, Treaty Termination and Historical Gloss, 92 Tex L Rev 773, 832
(2014). See also Mark Tushnet, Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts x–xi
(Princeton 1999) (noting that “constitutional interpretation goes on outside the courts”
and arguing that such interpretation is in fact “law because it is not in the first instance
either the expression of pure preferences by officials and voters or the expression of unfiltered moral judgements”).
183 See Jack Goldsmith and Daryl Levinson, Law for States: International Law,
Constitutional Law, Public Law, 122 Harv L Rev 1791, 1813 (2009) (“A far greater number
of constitutional issues [than are decided by courts] will never be heard by any court
and are decided by nonjudicial political actors in Congress, the executive branch, and
state governments.”).
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converse Youngstown apply in nonjusticiable circumstances,
those applying the frameworks can benefit from courts’ application of Youngstown in prior cases that did raise justiciable questions. Youngstown cases can illuminate later converse
Youngstown situations by, for example, construing the powers of
multiple branches in a way that can be used in later outside-thecourts analyses, holding that certain powers are exclusive to one
branch and thus perhaps determinative in later assessments, or
providing methodological guidance on issues like the relevance of
historical gloss. Thus, converse Youngstown analysis can benefit
from the penumbras of judicial pronouncements in much the
same way that nonjusticiable Youngstown situations do.
Part III.A develops the converse Youngstown framework.
Part III.B then argues that the converse Youngstown framework
provides significant benefits over the current ad hoc approach to
analyzing nonexecutive conduct of foreign relations and avoids
some of the pitfalls that critics have identified with the traditional
Youngstown framework.
A.

Converse Youngstown for Nonexecutive Foreign Relations

Youngstown and converse Youngstown share the same basic
goal of guiding determination of the relative constitutional powers of competing branches. Both frameworks are triggered by explicit or implicit claims of power over an issue by more than one
branch of the federal government. To put it another way, both
Youngstown and converse Youngstown depend on at least two
branches of the federal government claiming constitutional authority over a particular issue. Once this circumstance is identified, the choice of the Youngstown framework versus the converse
Youngstown framework depends on which branch’s action is at
issue. If the president’s action is at issue, Youngstown applies; if
the actions of Congress or the courts are at issue, then converse
Youngstown applies.
The converse Youngstown framework focuses on the president’s position vis-à-vis acts of Congress or the courts. In traditional Youngstown analysis, the president is the actor, and Categories 1 to 3 are defined by Congress’s position—authorization,
silence, and opposition, respectively. Converse Youngstown flips
the actor and reactor roles.
A situation falls within converse Youngstown Category 1
when Congress or the courts take an action that is authorized by,
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coordinated with, or mediated through the executive. For nonexecutive conduct of foreign relations, Category 1 involves instances in which Congress or the courts engage foreign governments in direct communication that the US executive branch
explicitly or implicitly approves.
A quintessential example of Category 1 as applied to nonexecutive conduct of foreign relations is the routine interactions
between congressmen and foreign governments when congressmen travel abroad on congressional delegations (or “codels”). Such
official trips are coordinated with the State Department, which
provides in-country embassy support to visiting lawmakers, and
they also often involve the Defense Department, which may provide military transportation for lawmakers.184 By these actions
(and absent any other expressed disapproval of the trip), the executive can be understood either to tacitly consent to the legislators’ activities or to retain some control over their actions.
Another example of converse Youngstown Category 1 is typical invitations for foreign leaders to address Congress. Beginning
with King Kalākaua of Hawaii in 1874, more than one hundred
foreign leaders or dignitaries have addressed Congress.185 Usually
invitations for foreign leaders to address Congress are coordinated with the executive branch,186 with the executive explicitly
or at least tacitly by its coordination actions approving of the invitations. The 2015 invitation to Benjamin Netanyahu was anomalous precisely because it was not coordinated with or approved
by the White House.
184 See, for example, Department of Defense, Directive No 4515.12: DoD Support for
Travel of Members and Employees of Congress *1–2 (Jan 15, 2010), archived at
http://perma.cc/KHW4-FCSG (discussing the Defense Department’s support for congressional travel); Bureau of Legislative Affairs (US Department of State), archived at
http://perma.cc/46ZN-SGMY (noting that the Bureau of Legislative Affairs “facilitates
Congressional travel to overseas posts for Members and staff ” ); Scoville, 112 Mich L Rev
at 339–40 (cited in note 10) (discussing State Department and Defense Department roles
in supporting congressional travel abroad).
185 Joint Meeting & Joint Session Addresses (cited in note 94).
186 See, for example, Jacob R. Straus, CRS Insights: Foreign Heads of State
Addressing Congress *1 (Federation of American Scientists, Feb 27, 2015), archived at
http://perma.cc/8H93-RJ2P (“[S]ome form of consultation protocol may exist between the
executive and legislative branch when foreign leaders visit the United States on official
duties and the leader will be invited to speak to Congress. However, no such procedure is
codified in law or in House or Senate Rules.”). See also Nakamura, Sullivan, and
Fahrenthold, Republicans Invite Netanyahu (cited in note 95) (calling the Netanyahu invitation “a departure from normal procedure” because it was not coordinated with the executive branch); Visits (US Department of State), archived at http://perma.cc/9N9A-PQ76
(explaining that the State Department’s Office of the Chief of Protocol “plans, arranges
and executes detailed programs for visiting Chiefs of State and Heads of Government”).
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Categories 2 and 3 of converse Youngstown similarly parallel
their regular Youngstown counterparts. In converse Youngstown
Category 2, Congress or the courts engage in direct communications with a foreign government and the president remains silent,
neither approving nor disapproving the action. In converse
Youngstown Category 3, Congress or the courts engage in direct
communications with a foreign government, and the executive
branch actively opposes or denounces the nonexecutive branch’s
action.187 The next Section explores in detail examples of Category 2 and Category 3 and the constitutional questions they raise.
B.

Benefits of the Converse Youngstown Framework

The converse Youngstown framework provides several advantages over the current ad hoc methods of analyzing instances
of congressional and judicial involvement in foreign relations,188
and it is less susceptible to some of the criticisms lodged against
the traditional Youngstown framework.
1. Captures and encourages initiative.
The converse Youngstown framework captures the reality
that the scrappiness often attributed to the executive in areas of
shared power is not exclusive to that branch. Professor Louis
Henkin explained that “[c]oncurrent power often begets a race for
initiative and the President will usually ‘get there first.’” 189 But
usually is not always, and as the examples in Part II.A show,
sometimes Congress or the judiciary “gets there first.”
In Youngstown itself, Justice Jackson worried that
Congress’s power would be overwhelmed by executive initiative.
He explained that he had “no illusion that any decision by this
Court can keep power in the hands of Congress if it is not wise

187 The utility of the converse Youngstown framework is not limited to instances of
nonexecutive conduct of foreign relations. For examples of additional situations in which
the converse Youngstown framework could be deployed, see notes 282–84 and accompanying text.
188 Consider Adrian Vermeule, Chevron as a Legal Framework (JOTWELL, Oct 24,
2017), archived at http://perma.cc/R56T-Z386 (arguing that Justice Jackson’s Youngstown
concurrence “supplied a capacious-but-coordinating legal framework that allows various
judges on various occasions to express the major competing concerns about the relationship between legislative and executive power” and that “it has the great virtue of giving
[judges] a conceptual structure within which to speak to one another and disagree with
each other”).
189 Henkin, Foreign Affairs at 93 (cited in note 1).
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and timely in meeting its problems.”190 He warned that “there was
worldly wisdom in the maxim attributed to Napoleon that ‘[t]he
tools belong to the man who can use them,’” 191 suggesting that the
executive would usually seize and use shared powers. But
Congress and the judiciary have proven capable of seizing and
using tools at their disposal to assert power in foreign relations.192
The converse Youngstown framework mandates the identification of constitutional powers (if any) at issue for each branch
and weighs competing powers against one another, rather than
simply looking to the executive branch powers in play. The addition of converse Youngstown to the Youngstown landscape ensures that there is a framework for analyzing assertions of power,
regardless of which branch is using the tools at its disposal.
In addition, the converse Youngstown framework may actually encourage the nonexecutive branches to take the initiative
more often. By mandating consideration of any constitutional
powers implicated by the nonexecutive branches’ actions, the
framework incentivizes those branches to make constitutional arguments. Of course, the executive may object to congressional or
judicial actions, but that’s just the start, not the end, of the constitutional analysis for a converse Youngstown Category 3 case.
Assertion of constitutional authority can play an offensive role in
asserting legislative or judicial prerogatives, but also a defensive
role, blocking executive claims that the nonexecutive branches
have acquiesced in executive dominance over particular issues.
Moreover, even if one president objects to an instance of nonexecutive initiative, such an aberrational (in the sense of out of
line with past presidents) objection may be insufficient to trigger
converse Youngstown Category 3. Analyses of both historical
gloss and acquiescence make related points. As Justice
Frankfurter explained in Youngstown, historical gloss on the separation of powers comes from “systematic, unbroken, executive
practice, long pursued to the knowledge of the Congress and never

190

Youngstown, 343 US at 654 (Jackson concurring).
Id (Jackson concurring).
192 See Transcript of Oral Argument, Zivotofsky v Clinton, Docket No 10-699, *10 (US
Nov 7, 2011) (available on Westlaw at 2011 WL 7005874) (reflecting Justice Antonin
Scalia’s description of the “usual inter-branch hand wrestling” in which Congress “has an
innumerable number of clubs with which to beat the executive”); Bradley and Morrison,
126 Harv L Rev at 457 (cited in note 48) (discussing Jackson’s quotation of Napoleon and
noting that the “observation is generalizable to the preservation of executive as well as
legislative power”).
191
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before questioned.”193 When an executive objection to a congressional or judicial practice is instead unsystematic and illustrative
of a break with past practice, perhaps the aberrant objection
should be disregarded, keeping the nonexecutive branch in converse Youngstown Category 2.
Similarly, in assessing how to evaluate one branch’s nonobjection to another’s actions, scholars have argued that acquiescence cannot be inferred from a single instance of nonobjection
because “[o]therwise, the outlier decisions of a single administration could change the constitutional order.”194 Just so. Therefore,
if many presidents have explicitly or impliedly approved of a type
of nonexecutive foreign relations, then one president’s opposition
may be insufficient to move the conduct into Category 3. Aberrant
executive objections—especially ones that do not appear to be
based on rigorous analysis—should not be sufficient to disrupt
prior executive acquiescence to congressional or judicial practice.
For all of these reasons, the converse Youngstown framework
both captures the initiative that Congress and the judiciary may
exercise and incentivizes them to undertake additional actions.195
193 Youngstown, 343 US at 610 (Frankfurter concurring). See also 18 Op Off Legal
Counsel at 178 (cited in note 43) (“[A] pattern of executive conduct, made under claim of
right, extended over many decades and engaged in by Presidents of both parties, ‘evidences
the existence of a broad constitutional power.’”), quoting Office of Legal Counsel,
Presidential Power to Use the Armed Forces Abroad without Statutory Authorization, 4A
Op Off Legal Counsel 185, 187 (Feb 12, 1980).
194 Bradley and Morrison, 126 Harv L Rev at 454 (cited in note 48).
195 A similar argument may apply to state initiatives with respect to foreign relations,
which are becoming increasingly frequent in the Trump era. Although the primary legal
framework for assessing the permissibility of states’ actions is preemption, the Supreme
Court in preemption cases has considered the extent to which the federal government is
unified or divided over the potentially preemptive federal policy or action. For example, in
Crosby v National Foreign Trade Council, 530 US 363 (2000), the Court relied on the fact
that the president was acting in Youngstown Category 1—with Congress’s approval—in
imposing sanctions on Burma as a reason to find that stricter Massachusetts sanctions
were obstacle preempted. Id at 375–77. In other words, the fact that Congress and the
president agreed caused the Court to increase the scope of federal preemption vis-à-vis the
states. Similar reasoning may apply to Category 3 cases in either the classic Youngstown
or converse Youngstown frameworks: if Congress and the president disagree, courts may
use the disagreement as a justification for finding a narrower scope for federal preemption,
leaving states with more freedom to act. This possibility is a reason for Congress to disagree with President Trump—and to do so vocally—on issues like withdrawal from the
Paris Climate Agreement. See, for example, Michael D. Shear, Trump Will Withdraw U.S.
from Paris Climate Agreement (NY Times, June 1, 2017), online at http://www
.nytimes.com/2017/06/01/climate/trump-paris-climate-agreement.html (visited Feb 7,
2018) (Perma archive unavailable). Even if Congress’s opposition does not stop the presidential action, it might have the more indirect effect of shrinking the preemptive scope of
federal power to allow state initiatives to proceed. See, for example, Hiroko Tabuchi and
Henry Fountain, Bucking Trump, These Cities, States, and Companies Commit to Paris
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2. Decreases indeterminacy.
The converse Youngstown framework avoids some of the pitfalls that critics observe in the traditional Youngstown framework. In particular, converse Youngstown decreases, though does
not eliminate, the indeterminacy that dogs traditional
Youngstown analysis.
Critics have assailed Youngstown for being indeterminate on
at least two dimensions.196 Professor Tribe recently highlighted
indeterminacy in Youngstown Category 2, calling “the nearly sacrosanct triptych [ ] deeply ambiguous on the key question of what
to make of congressional silence.”197 Tribe argues that
Youngstown fails to provide a
normative framework for deciding: (1) which kinds of presidential action in the relevant sphere are void unless plainly
authorized by Congress ex ante; (2) which are valid unless
plainly prohibited by Congress ex ante; and (3) which are of
uncertain validity when Congress has been essentially “silent” on the matter although dropping hints about its supposed “will.” 198
The converse Youngstown framework is less susceptible to indeterminacy in Category 2. The differences between Youngstown
and converse Youngstown on this score stem from the differing
institutional features of the counterparty branch in each framework. In traditional Youngstown, the executive acts, and then the
question is what position, if any, has Congress (the counterparty)
taken. Very often Congress is silent, and that silence may be attributable to a variety of factors. Congressional silence may indicate congressional acquiescence in the executive’s claim of

Accord (NY Times, June 1, 2017), online at http://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/01/
climate/american-cities-climate-standards.html (visited Feb 7, 2018) (Perma archive unavailable). I plan to explore further the federalism implications of Youngstown and converse
Youngstown in future work.
196 Henkin adds perhaps a third type of indeterminacy critique in arguing that
“Justice Jackson did not tell us, or offer a principle that might help us determine, which
powers are concurrent.” Henkin, Foreign Affairs at 95 (cited in note 1). This argument
may demand unnecessary work from the Youngstown framework. The question of which
powers are concurrent can be answered by looking to constitutional text, historical practice, or the claims of competing branches. The Youngstown framework is needed to help
adjudicate competing claims to power, not to identify such competing claims in the first
instance.
197 Laurence H. Tribe, Transcending the Youngstown Triptych: A Multidimensional
Reappraisal of Separation of Powers Doctrine, 126 Yale L J F 86, 91 (2016).
198 Id at 92.
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power.199 But structural features of the legislative branch, rather
than considered congressional agreement with the executive, may
often explain congressional silence.200 “Structural [i]mpediments
to [c]ongressional [a]ction,” including voting rules and veto gates,
make it difficult for Congress to pass legislation to counter executive initiative.201 Moreover, collective-action problems limit the
incentives for individual congressmen to act to protect the prerogatives of the institution because the benefits of such action inure to Congress as a whole, rather than to the individual legislator.202 These features do not suggest that Congress is impotent
to check claims of executive power,203 just that Congress often
will not formally act to approve or disapprove of executive action. Congressional failure to act—whether out of agreement or
inertia—causes cases of contested power to be in the indeterminate Category 2.

199 See Henkin, Foreign Affairs at 93 (cited in note 1) (“When the President acts and
Congress is silent, there is often a justifiable presumption that Congress has acquiesced
in, even approved, what the President has done; if so, the action can be seen as supported
by the constitutional powers of both branches.”); Bradley and Morrison, 126 Harv L Rev
at 433–36 (cited in note 48) (distinguishing between acquiescence as implicit agreement
by Congress to the executive claim and acquiescence as waiver of Congress’s powers).
200 See Terry M. Moe and William G. Howell, The Presidential Power of Unilateral
Action, 15 J L, Econ & Org 132, 140 (1999) (“Congress is burdened by collective action
problems and heavy transaction costs that make it extremely difficult for that institution
to fashion a timely, coherent response to presidential action, or even to respond at all.”).
201 Bradley and Morrison, 126 Harv L Rev at 440 (cited in note 48).
202 See, for example, id (noting that “[b]ecause Congress is a plural body,” all members
of Congress “benefit from the protection and enhancement of legislative authority even if
some of them do not contribute to the effort,” and therefore that “each individual member
has relatively little incentive to expend resources trying to increase or defend congressional power, since he or she will not be able to capture most of the gains”); Moe and
Howell, 15 J L, Econ & Org at 144 (cited in note 200) (explaining that congressmen, each
motivated to secure their own reelection, “are trapped in a prisoners’ dilemma: all might
benefit if they could cooperate in defending or advancing Congress’s power, but each has
a strong incentive to free ride in favor of the local constituency”).
203 For example, Congress has less formal tools, such as “oversight hearings, nonbinding resolutions, the threat of contempt proceedings, and public disclosure of information,” which “are not subject to the collective action problems that beset the formal
legislative process.” Bradley and Morrison, 126 Harv L Rev at 446 (cited in note 48).
Professors Bradley and Morrison argue that these less formal options for expressing congressional disapproval of executive action should be taken into account in Youngstown
analysis and that doing so would reduce the number of cases in which interpreters try to
draw meaning from silence. Id at 451 (“[I]nclud[ing] a wider array of congressional responses to executive action will substantially shrink the universe of cases where Congress
can truly be said to have remained silent, which will in turn shrink the number of cases
drawing inferences from such silence. That is all to the good.”).
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The converse Youngstown framework is less susceptible to
this concern because it posits that the governmental actor is either Congress or the courts, which thereby casts the executive in
the role of counterparty. The executive is very differently structured and incentivized than Congress.204 The executive, by design,
is comparatively more nimble than Congress and can act
quickly.205 The unitary nature of the executive ensures that it does
not suffer from the same collective-action problems that restrain
congressional action and that the executive captures the benefits of expending capital on protecting the branch’s institutional
prerogatives, making it more likely to do so.206 These features
mean that the executive is much more likely than Congress to
(re)act when its powers are challenged.207 In converse
Youngstown situations, executive silence will be rare,208 which
means far fewer Category 2 cases than traditional Youngstown
and thus less indeterminacy.209
Converse Youngstown not only decreases indeterminacy by
limiting the number of Category 2 cases; it also clarifies the import of those Category 2 cases that do occur. As noted above,

204 See id at 439–40 (“Congress and the President are not equally situated in their
ability to take action.”).
205 See, for example, Edward S. Corwin, The President: Office and Powers 200 (NYU
2d ed 1941) (noting that in the “struggle for the privilege of directing American foreign
policy . . . the President has . . . certain great advantages,” including “the unity of the office, its capacity for secrecy and despatch,” and “the fact that it is always on hand and
ready for action, whereas the houses of Congress are in adjournment much of the time”).
206 See Bradley and Morrison, 126 Harv L Rev at 452 (cited in note 48) (“The executive
branch faces fewer collective action and veto obstacles than does Congress, and thus it is
easier for the President and those serving under him to take legally consequential steps
to protect executive prerogatives.”); Moe and Howell, 15 J L, Econ & Org at 144–45 (cited
in note 200) (explaining that “Presidents are not hobbled by” the collective-action problems
that plague Congress and that “not only is the presidency a unitary institution with the
capacity for coherent action, but there is also substantial congruence between the president’s individual interests and the interests of the institution”).
207 See Moe and Howell, 15 J L, Econ & Org at 145 (cited in note 200) (noting a “fundamental imbalance” in which “Presidents have both the will and the capacity to promote
the power of their own institution, but individual legislators have neither and cannot be
expected to promote the power of Congress as a whole in any coherent, forceful way”).
208 Henkin, Foreign Affairs at 93 (cited in note 1) (“A President is less likely to remain
silent when Congress acts in what he considers his domain.”).
209 Category 2 cases are, of course, still possible. The “Dear Comandante” letter may
be an example. The Reagan administration apparently offered no official statement for
more than a year, at which point the secretary of state condemned the letter before repudiating the criticism later the same day. See notes 147–53 and accompanying text. See
also notes 68–72 and accompanying text (discussing the routine filings by foreign sovereigns as parties in cases before US courts—filings that do not typically occasion endorsement or objection by the executive).
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traditional Youngstown Category 2 cases involve congressional silence, and “assigning interpretive consequences to congressional
silence or inaction is perilous at best” because congressional silence may indicate agreement or simply reflect inertia.210 In converse Youngstown Category 2, the silence is executive, not congressional, and executive silence is arguably more meaningful.
Because the executive does not have the structural impediments to action and collective-action problems that Congress
does, inertia is less likely to be the cause of executive silence.
In other words, because it is so (comparatively) easy for the executive to speak and to disapprove the actions of the other
branches,211 executive silence is more likely to indicate meaningful agreement with (or at least nonobjection to) the acting
branch’s claim of authority.212 Understanding executive silence
in converse Youngstown as more communicative than congressional silence in traditional Youngstown further limits indeterminacy in Category 2.
Although converse Youngstown mitigates the Category 2 indeterminacy critique, that’s not the only indeterminacy problem
with Youngstown. Commentators have raised a separate critique
of indeterminacy in Category 3 cases, when the president acts in
opposition to the expressed will of Congress. Henkin noted that
in Category 3, “Jackson[’s] ‘arithmetic’” does not “suggest which

210

Bradley and Morrison, 126 Harv L Rev at 451 (cited in note 48).
To object to legislation, for example, the president may exercise the veto, express
concerns in a signing statement, or “publicly refus[e] to enforce or comply with the statute,” and “[p]residential administrations regularly avail themselves of one or more of these
means, on the understanding that failure to do so could be taken as acquiescence.” Id at
452–53 (cited in note 48). The president can also object to nonlegislative congressional or
judicial actions in other ways, such as in public statements. See, for example, Michael J.
Glennon, The Use of Custom in Resolving Separation of Powers Disputes, 64 BU L Rev
109, 140 (1984) (arguing that the president can object to congressional actions through
“[p]ress releases, statements made upon signing or vetoing of a bill, [ ] statements made
during a press conference,” or statements by other executive officials that are attributable
to the president).
212 See Henkin, Foreign Affairs at 93 (cited in note 1) (arguing that while executive
silence is less likely than congressional silence, a president’s “failure to veto Congressional
legislation or to protest other Congressional initiatives might also imply acquiescence and
mute any objection that Congress lacks constitutional authority”); Bradley and Morrison,
126 Harv L Rev at 454 (cited in note 48) (arguing that “[e]xecutive silence . . . should generally carry greater weight than congressional silence” because executive-branch actors
can easily object and they “understand that failure to object to legislative limits on executive authority may be treated as accepting their constitutionality”).
211
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branch prevails in case of conflict between them.”213 A fairer description might be that Jackson does suggest, but does not settle,
which branch should prevail in Category 3.
Prior to Zivotofsky II, Category 3 was understood to include
a strong presumption that the president loses, something akin to
the maxim that in other constitutional contexts “strict scrutiny”
is “‘strict’ in theory and fatal in fact.”214 Category 3 might have
been glossed as presumption in theory, fatal in fact.215 But that
changed in Zivotofsky II when, for the first time, the Supreme
Court upheld a presidential action in foreign relations that contravened a statute.216 Prior to the Court’s decision, Category 3 indeterminacy was more hypothetical than actual. But
Zivotofsky II’s holding brings to the fore the Category 3 indeterminacy inherent in the original Youngstown framework.217
Converse Youngstown largely mirrors the Category 3 indeterminacy issue from Youngstown. In the foreign relations context and in the wake of Zivotofsky II, however, Category 3 in converse Youngstown may be slightly less indeterminate. Converse
Youngstown Category 3 does not arithmetically resolve which
branch should prevail, but like Youngstown, it implies a presumption that the acting branch—Congress or the courts—will lose
when faced with opposition from the counterparty (the executive).
Category 3 in both frameworks at least starts with a presumption, making it more determinate than Category 2, which in classic Youngstown puts no thumb on the scale for either branch.

213

Henkin, Foreign Affairs at 95 (cited in note 1).
Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971 Term—Foreword: In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 Harv L Rev 1, 8
(1972). See also Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis
of Strict Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 Vand L Rev 793, 794–95 (2006) (noting that
Professor Gerald Gunther coined the phrase).
215 See Swaine, 83 S Cal L Rev at 311 (cited in note 18) (calling Category 3 “practically
a death knell for executive branch action”).
216 See Zivotofsky II, 135 S Ct at 2113 (Roberts dissenting) (“For our first 225 years,
no President prevailed when contradicting a statute in the field of foreign affairs.”); id at
2116 (Roberts dissenting) (arguing that the Court’s ruling for the president “takes the
perilous step—for the first time in our history—of allowing the President to defy an Act of
Congress in the field of foreign affairs”).
217 This indeterminacy bespeaks yet another similarity to the strict scrutiny framework: despite the popularity of the “fatal in fact” label, Professor Adam Winkler has shown
that in practice “strict scrutiny is survivable in fact,” with “30 percent of all applications
of strict scrutiny . . . result[ing] in the challenged law being upheld.” Winkler, 59 Vand L
Rev at 796 (cited in note 214). Just so with presidential actions in Category 3, per
Zivotofsky II.
214
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In some cases, however, the presumption of congressional or
judicial loss in converse Youngstown Category 3 cases may be
somewhat stronger than the presumption of executive loss in classic Youngstown Category 3. In converse Youngstown Category 3,
the presumptive winner is the executive, whose power over recognition decisions the Supreme Court recognized to be exclusive in
Zivotofsky II.218 For nonexecutive foreign relations scenarios in
which the executive power at issue is recognition, therefore, it will
be difficult for Congress or the courts (the presumptive losers) to
overcome the presumption that the executive should prevail. In
other words, converse Youngstown does not solve the Category 3
indeterminacy problem, but for certain foreign relations cases, it
does align the presumption about which branch prevails with the
executive, who the Supreme Court has held has at least one exclusive power related to foreign relations.
3. Simplifies constitutional analysis.
By taking into account the relative position of the executive
branch as to the actions by the nonexecutive branch, the converse
Youngstown framework simplifies the constitutional analysis.
The simplification of the constitutional analysis is particularly apparent with respect to cases in converse Youngstown Category 1. Instead of asking whether the nonexecutive branch has
the constitutional authority to take the action it has taken, the
converse Youngstown framework asks whether the nonexecutive
branch plus the executive branch (which has approved the nonexecutive branch’s action) have the constitutional authority. The
nonexecutive branch does not have to prevail based on the
strength of its own power alone; rather, it benefits from the boost
provided by executive approval.
Different theories could explain the nature of the constitutional boost provided by the executive’s approval. Presidential approval could be considered a delegation to the nonexecutive
branch,219 such that congressional or judicial communications to
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See note 35 and accompanying text.
In the traditional Youngstown context, Jackson described Category 1 as involving
a congressional delegation to the president. See Youngstown, 343 US at 635 (Jackson concurring) (arguing that in Category 1, the president’s “authority is at its maximum, for it
includes all that he possesses in his own right plus all that Congress can delegate”).
219
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foreign governments would effectively represent exercises of delegated executive power.220 Alternatively, executive approval may
suggest that preexisting congressional or judicial power should be
construed broadly. Presidential endorsement demonstrates that
the nonexecutive branch’s actions are helpful to or desired by the
executive, and thus that any concern about the nonexecutive
branches’ infringement on executive power would be misplaced,
opening the door to reading whatever power the nonexecutive
branch possesses to its outer limits.
Regardless of the precise explanation, long-standing practice
supports the executive effectively deputizing members of the
other branches.221 “[T]hroughout American history,” members of
Congress “have served as members of or advisers to the U.S. delegation negotiating a treaty.”222 For example, President William
McKinley “appointed three Senators to a commission to negotiate
a treaty with Spain” in 1898,223 and fully half of the members of
the US delegation to the San Francisco Conference to negotiate
the UN Charter were sitting members of Congress.224 The executive’s occasional decision to include congressmen in treaty negotiations is “now common and no longer challenged.”225 The same
logic can justify, for example, senators’ and representatives’ more
ad hoc interactions with foreign officials while traveling abroad.

220 See, for example, Scoville, 112 Mich L Rev at 377 (cited in note 10) (arguing that
Article II “empowers the president to delegate executive power to members of the House
and Senate so that they can act on his behalf”).
221 For examples from the judiciary, see id at 379 (arguing that “official practice
strongly suggests that horizontal executive delegation is permissible” and providing examples of presidents tasking Supreme Court justices to foreign relations–related activities, such as Jackson’s service as the chief US prosecutor at the Nuremberg trials). For
congressional examples, see notes 223–25 and accompanying text.
222 Treaties and Other International Agreements: The Role of the United States Senate,
S Prt No 106-71, 106th Cong, 2d Sess 109 (2001).
223 Id.
224 See id at 109–10 (detailing this and numerous other examples). See also Louis
Fisher, “The Law”: Treaty Negotiation; A Presidential Monopoly?, 38 Pres Stud Q 144,
151–52 (2008) (recounting numerous examples of congressmen serving as members of or
advisers to treaty-negotiating delegations).
225 Henkin, Foreign Affairs at 178 (cited in note 1). See also id at 82 & n * (cited in
note 1) (noting that appointing congressmen to delegations to international conferences
“no longer raises constitutional questions under Art. 1, sec. 6, cl. 2”). This is so despite
earlier questions about the practice’s conformity with the Constitution’s Incompatibility
Clause. See US Const Art I, § 6, cl 2 (“[N]o Person holding any Office under the United
States, shall be a Member of either House during his Continuance in Office.”). See also
Henkin, Foreign Affairs at 178 & n ** (cited in note 1) (detailing earlier examples of
Incompatibility Clause controversies).
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Accounting for the confluence of the executive and
nonexecutive branches’ authority allows adjudicators of the constitutional question, whether legislators, judges, or executive officials, to engage in constitutional avoidance. As the Supreme
Court has explained, “If there is one doctrine more deeply rooted
than any other in the process of constitutional adjudication, it is
that we ought not to pass on questions of constitutionality . . . unless such adjudication is unavoidable.”226 Converse Youngstown
renders some constitutional adjudications avoidable for Category 1 cases. In particular, the converse Youngstown framework makes it unnecessary to decide the precise scope of the
nonexecutive branch’s power so long as the executive’s power
alone or a broad understanding of the nonexecutive branch’s
power is sufficient to surpass the constitutional threshold.
Take, for example, routine invitations for foreign leaders to
address Congress. These invitations are typically done with the
approval of and in coordination with the executive branch. For
such coordinated invitations, the constitutional analysis is simple: assuming the president’s power to receive ambassadors covers inviting a foreign leader to come to the United States, and
Congress agrees to hear the leader’s remarks, then there is no
need to assess the magnitude of Congress’s independent power to
invite and hear from a foreign leader or to do so over the objections of the executive branch.
A similar analysis applies for routine congressional travel
abroad. The executive branch approves explicitly, or at least implicitly, the legislators’ travel by providing transportation, coordinating meetings, and supplying other types of support.227 So
long as the executive branch’s power alone provides sufficient constitutional justification for having US citizens meet with foreign
government representatives, there is no need to determine what
(if any) independent power Congress has to conduct the activities.
Consider also the Supreme Court’s instigation of the shift
from foreign sovereigns filing diplomatic notes to filing amicus
briefs. This is a Category 1 case because the executive agreed to
226 Spector Motor Service, Inc v McLaughlin, 323 US 101, 105 (1944). See also
Department of Commerce v United States House of Representatives, 525 US 316, 343–44
(1999) (declining to reach the constitutional question presented due to the doctrine of constitutional avoidance); Richard H. Fallon Jr, et al, Hart and Wechsler’s The Federal Courts
and the Federal System 77–81 (West 7th ed 2015) (discussing constitutional avoidance).
227 See Scoville, 112 Mich L Rev at 339–40 (cited in note 10) (discussing executivebranch support for congressional travel to foreign countries). See also note 184 and accompanying text.
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the Supreme Court’s determination that foreign sovereign views
should no longer be communicated via diplomatic notes.228 The executive chose how to respond to the letter from the Supreme Court
clerk indicating that the diplomatic-note practice was contrary to
the Court’s rules, and in acceding to the Court’s letter, the executive actually went beyond the letter, declaring that not only would
it cease transmitting diplomatic notes to the Supreme Court, but
it would also cease transmitting them to courts of appeals and
eventually district courts as well.229 Because the Court and the
executive agreed, so long as the executive’s power to communicate
with foreign governments, considered in isolation, is sufficient to
support the shift from diplomatic notes to amicus briefs, there is
no need to determine whether the Supreme Court would have had
independent constitutional authority to effectuate the shift.
As these examples illustrate, by situating the nonexecutive
foreign relations analysis within a framework that explicitly accounts for the combined power of the executive and nonexecutive
branches, the converse Youngstown analysis allows adjudicators,
in the words of Justice Louis Brandeis, to avoid “anticipat[ing] a
question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it.”230 Nailing down the independent powers of each branch
is necessary for Category 2 and 3 cases, but not for Category 1
cases. Converse Youngstown thereby helps to explain why easy
cases are easy and to make some cases easier by rendering some
constitutional holdings avoidable.231
Before turning to Category 3 cases, an important caveat is
worth highlighting. The discussion of converse Category 1 cases
does not imply that if Congress or the courts receive executive
228

See notes 77–83 and accompanying text.
See notes 89–91 and accompanying text.
230 Ashwander v Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 US 288, 346–47 (1936) (Brandeis
concurring). See also Fallon, et al, Hart and Wechsler’s The Federal Courts at 77 (cited in
note 226) (calling Brandeis’s concurrence the “nearly canonical citation for the avoidance
doctrine”).
231 It is perhaps useful to note that the converse Youngstown framework would not
prohibit adjudicators from assessing the power of each branch; it merely means that they
do not have to for Category 1 cases. Providing adjudicators the discretion to address whichever question is easier—the power of each branch separately or the combined power of the
branches—is consistent with, for example, the Supreme Court’s shift in qualified immunity jurisprudence to give courts discretion over the ordering of determinations about
whether a constitutional violation occurred and whether the right violated was clearly
established. See Pearson v Callahan, 555 US 223, 242 (2009) (“Our decision does not prevent the lower courts from following the Saucier procedure; it simply recognizes that those
courts should have the discretion to decide whether that procedure is worthwhile in particular cases.”).
229
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support, they can do anything. As in traditional Youngstown Category 1, the branches’ actions even—or perhaps especially—when
they agree are cabined by constitutional limits, including protections for individual rights. However, in the foreign relations context in which both Youngstown and converse Youngstown would
most often be deployed, the interests at stake are typically the
powers of coordinate branches of government, not the rights of
individuals.232
Although the converse Youngstown framework does not eliminate Category 3 indeterminacy, it nonetheless adds value by
channeling the analysis of competing powers in circumstances in
which the executive objects to congressional or judicial conduct of
foreign relations. Like traditional Youngstown, converse
Youngstown does not answer the question of how to determine
whether there are competing powers at issue, but once claims of
competing power are made, both frameworks provide a presumptive prevailing branch and thereby frame the analysis.
In describing Category 3 in his Youngstown concurrence,
Jackson appears to suggest two alternative—though related—
analyses. The first is an arithmetic weighing up of the competing
powers that instructs that the president can prevail when “his
own constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of
Congress over the matter” generates a positive result.233 The second formulation instructs that “[c]ourts can sustain exclusive
Presidential control in such a case only by disabling the
Congress from acting upon the subject.”234 This second formulation may simply be a special application of the arithmetical
formula: a power of the president minus an erroneously
claimed power of Congress results in a power of the president
and thus a presidential win.
The second formulation—the exclusive formulation—may be
the one appropriate for easy Category 3 cases—that is, those in
which Congress lacks the power it claims. This would explain the
Supreme Court’s formulation of Category 3 in Zivotofsky II.
There, Justice Anthony Kennedy’s opinion for the Court explained that “[t]o succeed in this third category, the President’s
232 See Bradley and Morrison, 126 Harv L Rev at 416–17 (cited in note 48) (arguing
in the related context of assessments of historical practice that “[h]istorical practice in the
separation of powers context is distinctive [ ] in that it generally involves conduct by one
political branch implicating the interests and prerogatives of the other,” rather than individual rights).
233 Youngstown, 343 US at 637 (Jackson concurring).
234 Id at 637–38 (Jackson concurring) (emphasis added).
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asserted power must be both ‘exclusive’ and ‘conclusive’ on the
issue.”235 The Court went on to hold for the president—despite
Congress’s opposition—on the ground that “Congress . . . has no
constitutional power that would enable it to initiate diplomatic
relations with a foreign nation.”236 In the Court’s framing, at least,
Zivotofsky II was an easy Category 3 case: the president’s recognition power was exclusive, so there was no congressional power
to subtract. The result would have been the same, regardless of
which verbal formulation of Category 3 the Court employed. The
two formulations of Category 3 are not, however, interchangeable
for “hard” Category 3 cases: those in which competing branches
each possess some competing powers and deploy their powers in
opposition to one another.
For purposes of converse Youngstown, the arithmetic formulation gains increased importance. Because converse Youngstown
casts the executive in the role of counterparty, there are unlikely
to be many easy Category 3 cases. It would be a rare case in which
the executive would be entirely “disable[ed] . . . from acting upon
the subject” when the subject touches on foreign relations.237 If the
totally disabled formulation were the only understanding of Category 3, then converse Youngstown would suggest that Congress
or the courts would always lose Category 3 cases because the executive would have some power to act upon the subject. The arithmetic formulation, however, includes greater flexibility and better captures the likely scenario in foreign relations cases—that
such cases will often be hard cases in which both the executive
and the nonexecutive branch have some power.
Zivotofsky II did not have to confront the complexities of the
arithmetical formulation because it held that Congress had no
power over recognition. In making this “easy” Category 3 holding,
however, the Court provided some guidance on the antecedent
question of the scope of executive and congressional powers in foreign relations. The United States argued that “the President has
‘exclusive authority to conduct diplomatic relations,’ along with
‘the bulk of foreign-affairs powers,’” 238 citing Curtiss-Wright
Export Corp.239 The Court pointedly “decline[d] to acknowledge
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Zivotofsky II, 135 S Ct at 2084.
Id at 2086.
237 Youngstown, 343 US at 637–38 (Jackson concurring).
238 Zivotofsky II, 135 S Ct at 2089, quoting Brief for Respondent, Zivotofsky v Kerry, Docket
No 13-628, *16, 18 (US filed Sept 22, 2014) (available on Westlaw at 2014 WL 4726506).
239 Curtiss-Wright Export Corp, 299 US at 320.
236
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that unbounded power”240 and instead emphasized that Congress
retains important authorities over foreign relations:
In a world that is ever more compressed and interdependent,
it is essential the congressional role in foreign affairs be understood and respected. For it is Congress that makes laws,
and in countless ways its laws will and should shape the
Nation’s course. The Executive is not free from the ordinary
controls and checks of Congress merely because foreign affairs are at issue. It is not for the President alone to determine the whole content of the Nation’s foreign policy.241
Zivotofsky II is at once a strong executive-power holding because the president prevailed in Category 3, but also an
executive-power defeat because of its explicit rejection of the executive’s broader claim of exclusive power over foreign relations.
For purposes of converse Youngstown analysis, although
Zivotofsky II relied on the “totally disabled” formulation of Category 3, the Court also suggested that outside the recognition context, it remains open to claims of foreign relations power by the
nonexecutive branches. Nonexecutive foreign relations cases,
therefore, are likely to be “hard” Category 3 cases in which
branches have competing claims of power, requiring an arithmetic resolution.242
Although the converse Youngstown framework does not resolve the Category 3 indeterminacy inherent in the Youngstown
framework, it can at least help to move beyond the mere identification of branches’ competing claims to authority to a regularized
analysis. Ultimately, the resolution of Category 3 cases will be
fact specific and may often depend on one’s view of the underlying
constitutional powers and appropriate methods of constitutional
interpretation. On hard Category 3 cases in both Youngstown
and converse Youngstown, reasonable minds may differ on the
outcome.
Three examples—two actual and one hypothetical—can help
to illustrate the utility and limits of the converse Youngstown
framework for Category 3 cases. The Cotton letter and the
240

Zivotofsky II, 135 S Ct at 2089.
Id at 2090 (citations omitted).
242 See Harold Hongju Koh, The National Security Constitution: Sharing Power after
the Iran-Contra Affair 67 (Yale 1990) (arguing that with respect to foreign affairs powers,
the Constitution “frequently . . . grants clearly related powers to separate institutions,
without ever specifying the relationship between those powers. . . . Most often, the text
simply says nothing about who controls certain domains”).
241
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Netanyahu invitation are Category 3 cases. In both instances,
Congress or a meaningful subset of Congress243 engaged directly
with foreign government officials, and the president expressly
disapproved. The hypothetical example is a reimagining of the
Supreme Court’s instigation of the shift from foreign governments
filing diplomatic notes to filing amicus briefs, but one in which
instead of going along with and expanding on the Supreme
Court’s desire not to receive diplomatic notes, the executive
branch disagreed and attempted to continue filing diplomatic
notes on behalf of foreign governments.
Taking first the Cotton letter, the converse Youngstown
framework instructs that the first step is identification of competing constitutional powers. On the executive-branch side, two powers may be implicated. The first is the general implied power to
conduct foreign relations, stemming from the president’s constitutional authority to “receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers.”244 Most legal commentators who have considered the
Cotton letter’s constitutional implications focus on potential interference with this presidential power.245 A similar interference
argument could be made with respect to the president’s power to
“make Treaties” with the advice and consent of two-thirds of the
Senate.246 Although the Iran agreement was ultimately concluded
as a political commitment,247 not an Article II treaty, there was
243 The inclusion of the Cotton letter as an example of nonexecutive conduct of foreign
relations could be challenged on several grounds. First, the letter was signed by fortyseven Republican senators and did not claim to speak for the Senate as a whole. Second,
the letter did not purport to speak for the United States—an action that would have been
a clear subversion of the president’s authority to conduct foreign relations. Rather, the
letter purported simply to provide information about the US constitutional system that
Iran “should seriously consider as negotiations progress.” Cotton, et al, Open Letter (cited
in note 128). See also Ku, 47 US Senators Send Iran’s Leader an Unnecessary(?) Primer
on How US Constitution Works (cited in note 143). On the other hand, as to the first point,
the letter was signed and sent on behalf of a group of senators sufficient to block adoption
of an agreement with Iran as either an Article II treaty or a congressional-executive agreement (given the filibuster), making the group a potentially constitutionally significant
bloc. See note 55 and accompanying text. And on the second point, the letter was apparently intended to and was understood as an attempt to interfere in ongoing negotiation of
an agreement with Iran, which suggests an intent to interfere with the president’s authority to negotiate on behalf of the United States. On balance, although some might argue
against inclusion of the Cotton letter as an example of nonexecutive conduct of foreign
relations, the question is sufficiently close that I have included the example for purposes
of discussion.
244 US Const Art II, § 3.
245 See notes 141–46 and accompanying text.
246 US Const Art II, § 2, cl 2.
247 Letter from Julia Frifield, Assistant Secretary for Legislative Affairs, US
Department of State to Representative Mike Pompeo *1 (Nov 19, 2015), archived at
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ambiguity on the agreement’s form when the senators sent the
Cotton letter.248 The president’s authority to “make Treaties” is
understood to include implied authority to negotiate them,249 and
thus the Cotton letter arguably could be understood as an interference with the president’s negotiating authority, in addition to
interference with the president’s authority to communicate with
foreign governments more generally.
With the presidential authorities on one side, the congressional side of the equation is more problematic. The Cotton letter
itself does not purport to invoke any constitutional authority. The
strongest possible argument would stem from the Senate’s role in
advising and consenting to treaties,250 but even as to that clear
textual power, the justification for transmitting the Cotton letter
to a foreign government’s executive branch is not clear.251 Traditionally, the Senate’s role has not extended to involvement in negotiations,252 which are left to the president, with the Senate (or
http://perma.cc/C32V-LKYK (“The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) is not a
treaty or an executive agreement. . . . The JCPOA reflects political commitments between
Iran, the P5+1 (the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Russia, China),
and the European Union.”). See also Jack Goldsmith, The Contributions of the Obama
Administration to the Practice and Theory of International Law, 57 Harv Intl L J 455, 465–
66 (2016) (discussing the status of the Iran deal as a political commitment).
248 For an overview of contemporaneous debates about the status of the Iran deal, see
Stephen Collison, Iran Deal: A Treaty or Not a Treaty, That Is the Question (CNN, Mar 12,
2015), archived at http://perma.cc/49XE-MHQ7; Carol Morello, In Iran Nuclear Talks, It’s
All in a Name (Wash Post, Mar 12, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/VSU9-9E9T (collecting disparate views).
249 See, for example, Treaties and Other International Agreements at 6 (cited in note
222) (“The first phase of treatymaking, negotiation and conclusion, is widely considered
an exclusive prerogative of the President except for making appointments which require
the advice and consent of the Senate.”); id at 97–98 (locating the president’s implied power
to negotiate international agreements in the Article II, § 2 power to “make Treaties,” as
well as the president’s powers to appoint and receive ambassadors and the Article II, § 1
vesting clause).
250 US Const Art II, § 2, cl 2 (“[The president] shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators
present concur.”).
251 See Henkin, Foreign Affairs at 81 (cited in note 1) (drawing a constitutional distinction between sense-of-Congress resolutions about international issues and “Congressional resolutions directly addressed to foreign governments,” which are “technically objectionable” because of the president’s status as the “sole organ of communication with
foreign governments”).
252 See Treaties and Other International Agreements at 2–3, 27–38 (cited in note 222)
(discussing the evolution of the Senate’s role with respect to treaty negotiation). One prominent historical episode deviates from the Senate’s traditional noninvolvement prior to
advising and consenting to a negotiated agreement. In 1789, President Washington personally went to the Senate to consult on “the terms of a treaty to be negotiated with the
Southern Indians.” Id at 33. The consultations went so badly that they are “famous as the
first and last times that a President personally appeared before the Senate to seek its
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Congress as a whole in the case of congressional-executive agreements) weighing in on a proposed treaty text after it has been
negotiated.253 Alternatively, the senators might have argued that
they were seeking to protect the Senate’s interest in ensuring that
the Iran agreement was concluded as an Article II treaty so that
the Senate would have the opportunity to advise and consent (or
not) to the deal. Assuming such a penumbral power exists, there
may be permissible and impermissible ways to exercise it. Such
an argument, for example, could support sending something like
the Cotton letter to the US executive branch as part of the routine
sparring among the branches about the scope of executive and
congressional power. The Senate’s power to advise and consent to
treaties, however, does not obviously indicate as a matter of text
or history any congressional authority to communicate with foreign powers negotiating with the US executive branch.
Deploying the arithmetic approach, Congress and the subset
of senators who sent the Cotton letter appear to have little constitutional power to support their actions and in fact invoked
none. Subtracting the president’s substantial foreign relations
and treaty-negotiating powers from the baseline of minimal congressional authority results in a loss for Congress. This may be a
common result for the instances of nonexecutive foreign relations
described as “outbound” in Part I. The implied power of the president to engage in direct communications with foreign governments will be present in all such circumstances, and neither
Congress nor the courts have a clear constitutional power to
transmit messages to foreign governments unless potentially acting at the direction of the executive (which would be Category 1,
not Category 3) or, in the case of the courts, engaging in routine
communications with foreign sovereigns who are parties in cases
before the courts.
Although finding constitutional footing for outbound nonexecutive foreign relations may often be difficult,254 instances

advice and consent.” Id. See also Chafetz, Congress’s Constitution at 281 (cited in note 142)
(describing the incident with an emphasis on how a senator used procedural mechanisms
to frustrate Washington).
253 See Treaties and Other International Agreements at 3 (cited in note 222) (“Although
Senators sometimes play a part in the initiation or development of a treaty, the Senate
role now is primarily to pass judgment on whether completed treaties should be ratified
by the United States.”).
254 To be sure, congresspersons have other avenues that do not involve direct communications to foreign governments to express their views on foreign policy issues. They can,
for example, make statements on the House or Senate floor, issue press releases, give
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involving inbound nonexecutive foreign relations—receipt by
Congress or the courts of direct communications from foreign governments—find firmer constitutional footing, as illustrated by the
next two examples.
The Netanyahu address to Congress presents a more complex
question for the Category 3 analysis. As explained in Part II, the
Netanyahu example is mixed inbound/outbound nonexecutive foreign relations: the invitation from Speaker Boehner to Netanyahu
was an outbound communication conveying a message—an invitation—to Netanyahu, but Netanyahu’s speech itself was inbound
nonexecutive foreign relations, delivery of a message from a foreign government to Congress. The characteristics of inbound nonexecutive foreign relations, however, dominate this case. The outbound communication was incidental to the inbound
communication and did not purport to convey substantive policy
messages, though of course the sending of the invitation at all did
communicate a message of willingness to engage with Netanyahu
at a time when the executive branch was not willing to do so.
The same process for analysis applies. First, what power or
powers of the executive branch are implicated by the Netanyahu
address? Again here, the president’s power to receive ambassadors is at issue and potentially infringed.255 Congress literally received, over the executive’s objection, an “Ambassador[ ] [or] other
public Minister[ ].”256
Unlike in the Cotton letter case where Congress sent an outbound message, Congress has an implied constitutional power on

speeches, and speak to the press. These avenues implicate other constitutional protections, including the Speech or Debate Clause and the First Amendment. US Const Art I,
§ 6, cl 1 (“[F]or any Speech or Debate in either House, [senators and representatives] shall
not be questioned in any other Place.”); US Const Amend I (“Congress shall make no law
. . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.”). Given the increasing sophistication
of foreign governments about the US government and competing power centers within it,
foreign governments are likely to be aware of statements relevant to their interests, even
if such statements are not communicated to them directly. See notes 159–60 and accompanying text. See also Spiro, GOP Iran Letter Might Be Unconstitutional (cited in note
127) (“[T]he above-the-fold attention given to the Cotton letter shows that there is something out of the ordinary going on here. If he had said the same things on CNN no one
would have paid any attention . . . . Not so as addressed to the Iranian leadership.”).
255 A clearer case of infringement would occur if Congress were to receive as a foreign
head of state a representative of an entity, such as Taiwan, that the United States (via the
executive branch) has declined to recognize. See Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs,
U.S. Relations with Taiwan (US Department of State, Sept 13, 2017), archived at
http://perma.cc/4MZV-3JYY (describing the history and current nature of the US-Taiwan
relationship).
256 US Const Art II, § 3.
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its side of the ledger in hearing from Netanyahu. In addressing
why he invited Netanyahu, Boehner explained:
[W]hen it comes to the threat of Iran having a nuclear
weapon—these are important messages that the Congress
needs to hear and the American people need to hear. And I
believe that Prime Minister Netanyahu is the perfect person
to deliver the message of how serious this threat is.257
Boehner’s view of congressional power finds support in
Supreme Court cases that have recognized an implied power of
Congress to obtain information in support of its legislative function.258 As the Court noted in a 1927 case, “the power of inquiry
. . . is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative
function.”259 The Court explained:
A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the
absence of information respecting the conditions which the
legislation is intended to affect or change; and where the
legislative body does not itself possess the requisite

257 Rep. John Boehner Sounds Off on Fight over Homeland Security Funding (cited in
note 105).
258 For academic agreement on this issue, see Neal Devins, Congressional-Executive
Information Access Disputes: A Modest Proposal—Do Nothing, 48 Admin L Rev 109, 111
(1996) (citation omitted):

Congress has broad investigatory powers to fulfill its responsibilities under the
Constitution. . . . A key element of Congress’ ability to carry out this mandate
depends on how much information is made available to it as it deliberates and
then legislates. Absent access to accurate, relevant information, it would probably be impossible to legislate either effectively or wisely.
See also J.W. Fulbright, Congressional Investigations: Significance for the Legislative
Process, 18 U Chi L Rev 440, 441 (1951) (explaining the view of a sitting senator that “[t]he
power to investigate is . . . the most necessary of all the powers underlying the legislative
function” because it “provides the legislature with eyes and ears and a thinking mechanism,” as well as “an orderly means of being in touch with and absorbing the knowledge,
experience and statistical data necessary for legislation in a complex democratic society”);
Morton Rosenberg, Congress’s Prerogative over Agencies and Agency Decisionmakers: The
Rise and Demise of the Reagan Administration’s Theory of the Unitary Executive, 57 Geo
Wash L Rev 627, 675 (1989) (noting that “no express provision of the Constitution . . .
specifically authorizes the Congress to conduct investigations and take testimony for the
purpose of performing its legitimate functions,” but “numerous decisions of the Supreme
Court have firmly established that the investigatory power of Congress is so essential to
the legislative function as to be implied from the general vesting of legislative power in
Congress”); Scoville, 112 Mich L Rev at 382–83 (cited in note 10) (discussing “Congress’s
implied power of investigation”).
259 McGrain v Daugherty, 273 US 135, 174 (1927). See also Eastland v United States
Servicemen’s Fund, 421 US 491, 504 (1975) (“This Court has often noted that the power to
investigate is inherent in the power to make laws.”).
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information—which not infrequently is true—recourse must
be had to others who do possess it.260
The Court has described Congress’s power of investigation or inquiry as “broad”261 and explained that “[t]he scope of the power of
inquiry . . . is as penetrating and far-reaching as the potential
power to enact and appropriate under the Constitution.”262 But
the Court has explained that “the power is not [ ] without limitations” and must be linked to some legitimate action of Congress,
such as legislation or appropriations.263 The Court has also declined to recognize a congressional power to inform the public, as
opposed to informing itself.264 Thus, Boehner’s claim of constitutional authority for the Netanyahu invitation must rest on the
first part of his explanation—the need for Congress to hear from
Netanyahu—rather than the second part, highlighting the need
for the US public to hear from him.
The implied legislative power of inquiry or investigation provides a counterweight to the executive’s constitutional power to

260

McGrain, 273 US at 175.
Watkins v United States, 354 US 178, 187 (1957). See also id (noting that “[t]he
power of the Congress to conduct investigations is inherent in the legislative process. . . .
It encompasses inquiries concerning the administration of existing laws as well as proposed or possibly needed statutes,” “surveys of defects in our social, economic or political
system for the purpose of enabling the Congress to remedy them,” and “probes into departments of the Federal Government to expose corruption, inefficiency or waste”).
262 Barenblatt v United States, 360 US 109, 111 (1959).
263 Id at 111. See also id at 111–12 (“Since Congress may only investigate into those
areas in which it may potentially legislate or appropriate, it cannot inquire into matters
which are within the exclusive province of one of the other branches of the Government.”);
Watkins, 354 US at 187:
261

[B]road as is this power of inquiry, it is not unlimited. There is no general authority to expose the private affairs of individuals without justification in terms
of the functions of the Congress. . . . Nor is the Congress a law enforcement or
trial agency. These are functions of the executive and judicial departments of
government. No inquiry is an end in itself; it must be related to, and in furtherance of, a legitimate task of the Congress. Investigations conducted solely for the
personal aggrandizement of the investigators or to ‘punish’ those investigated
are indefensible.
264 See Hutchinson v Proxmire, 443 US 111, 132–33 (1979) (explaining that although
prior cases “hold[ ] that congressional efforts to inform itself through committee hearings
are part of the legislative function,” Congress’s perceived “duty of Members to tell the
public about their activities . . . is not a part of the legislative function or the deliberations
that make up the legislative process”); Todd David Peterson, Congressional Investigations
of Federal Judges, 90 Iowa L Rev 1, 33 (2004) (arguing that although “Congress frequently
asserts that it possesses general authority to investigate for the purpose of informing the
American public,” the Supreme Court has not “endorsed” such claims and instead “has
suggested that the purpose of informing the American public is not within the core legislative mandate of Congress”).
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receive ambassadors in circumstances of inbound nonexecutive
foreign relations. When Congress requests or receives a communication from a foreign government official that appropriately
falls within the ambit of its power of inquiry—that is, the communication relates to actual or potential legislation or is ancillary to
another congressional power—Congress begins the arithmetic
analysis with a positive score.
Congress could arguably invoke the power of inquiry as to the
Netanyahu speech.265 In recent years, Congress has considered
and adopted legislation sanctioning Iran for its nuclear program.266 Moreover, at the time of Netanyahu’s address, the form
of the Iran deal was unclear. Congress might have therefore argued that hearing from Netanyahu was incident to its power to
approve international agreements. This argument, however, is
hampered by the fact that the invitation came from the speaker
of the House, not from the Senate, which has primary responsibility for approving treaties. Nonetheless, it might be incidental
to the legislative power to approve congressional-executive agreements. In other words, the legitimacy of Congress’s claim to engage in inbound nonexecutive foreign relations depends on
whether the foreign government’s communications can reasonably be argued to relate to a legitimate function of Congress, such
as legislation, appropriations, or advising and consenting to
treaties.267
Both Youngstown and converse Youngstown provide guidance on what to consider in resolving interbranch power disputes,
but neither determines which branch prevails once competing
powers are identified. A constitutional adjudicator’s determination about which branch prevails in Category 3 will be fact specific, depending on the circumstances of a particular case, which

265 The congressional power of inquiry or investigation may also be sufficient to justify
congressional travel abroad and meetings with foreign government officials as part of factfinding missions over the executive’s objection. See, for example, text accompanying notes
115–17 (discussing then-Speaker Pelosi’s travel to Syria and criticism from President
Bush). The determination of the constitutionality of such an action will depend on the
factors discussed below. See notes 268–70 and accompanying text.
266 See Iran Sanctions (US Department of the Treasury, Sept 25, 2017), archived at
http://perma.cc/PU38-CEN3 (collecting statutes regarding Iran sanctions).
267 See Magliocca, Netanyahu’s Address to a Joint Session Is Not Unconstitutional
(cited in note 110) (proposing that the standard for evaluating the constitutionality of the
Netanyahu address “would be whether Congress is considering legislation related to the
speech,” and that because it was considering a new Iran sanctions bill, “if Congress wants
to hear from Netanyahu or anybody else with something useful to say about that, I think
that they can”).
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powers are invoked, and the strength of each branch’s arguments
for the existence and scope of its claimed powers. A determination
about which branch prevails in Category 3 will also likely vary
depending on an interpreter’s views of the relative salience of different kinds of arguments the branches might make. For example, an interpreter may rely on the extent of interference one
branch poses to the other branch’s power,268 the historical practice
to support each branch’s claims,269 or the intent of the branches,
especially whether they intended to interfere with the other
branch’s exercise of its competing power.270 Reasonable minds
may disagree about the relative importance of these factors or
may add others, and reasonable minds will certainly disagree
about the application of these factors to specific facts.271
The Netanyahu address to Congress over the president’s objection is a close question. Some factors cast serious doubt on
Congress’s position. In particular, the reception of a foreign
governmental leader over the executive’s objection was
unprecedented. Congress therefore has no support in historical
practice, and the long-standing practice of foreign leaders addressing Congress only in coordination with the executive branch
instead supports the president’s position. Moreover, the
Netanyahu invitation was widely understood as an attempt to interfere with the Iranian nuclear deal negotiations, suggesting
that Congress did intend to interfere with the president’s power
to communicate with foreign governments and to negotiate agreements. On the other hand, the degree of interference with the
president’s communication and negotiation powers appears, at
least in retrospect, to have been minimal. The Iran deal was concluded, and it was done in a form that did not require Senate or
congressional approval. As the debates among legal commentators about the constitutionality of the invitation reveal,272 reasonable minds can reach different results on this case, but deploying
the converse Youngstown framework would clarify the terms of
268 See Morrison v Olson, 487 US 654, 691 (1988) (assessing the constitutionality of a
congressionally imposed “good cause” restriction on removal of an executive officer based
on whether the restriction “unduly trammels on executive authority”).
269 See notes 46–54 and accompanying text.
270 See Zivotofsky II, 135 S Ct at 2095 (citing as one reason that a statute infringed
the president’s exclusive recognition power “the undoubted fact that the purpose of the
statute was to infringe on the recognition power”).
271 See Vermeule, Chevron as a Legal Framework (cited in note 188) (arguing that a
“legal framework” has “staying power” when it is sufficiently “flexible to appeal to judges
with competing views, who can all articulate their positions within the framework”).
272 See notes 108–11 and accompanying text.
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debate by directing consideration of the powers of both branches
and providing a mechanism for weighing their interaction.
A final example of Category 3 analysis rests on a hypothetical. Suppose that upon receiving the Supreme Court clerk’s letter
stating that filing of diplomatic notes did not comply with the
Court’s rules, the Department of Justice had attempted to continue filing them instead of taking its actual approach of declining
to file diplomatic notes with the Supreme Court or the lower federal courts. The branches would have clearly been in opposition,
with the Supreme Court asserting its right to control who can file
and how they can file with the Court, and the executive asserting
that regardless of the Court’s stated rules, the executive had the
right to present foreign governments’ views to the Court.
In this hypothetical Category 3 case, the executive’s asserted
power would again have been the implied power to conduct foreign relations and to handle communications to and from foreign
governments. But the Court would have had a strong claim to
power on its side as well—namely, the implied or inherent power
of courts to control their own processes. The Supreme Court has
recognized the “inherent power of every court of justice to control
its own process.”273 In particular, the Court has explained that
“[g]uided by considerations of justice, and in the exercise of supervisory powers, federal courts may, within limits, formulate procedural rules not specifically required by the Constitution or the
Congress.”274 The courts’ inherent authority includes the power to
appoint persons, such as amici and special masters, to assist the
court in carrying out its functions, as well as to allow participation by those who can assist the court.275 Rules governing how interested parties may (and may not) communicate their views to

273

Krippendorf v Hyde, 110 US 276, 282 (1884).
United States v Hasting, 461 US 499, 505 (1983) (citation omitted). See also
Carlisle v United States, 517 US 416, 425–26 (1996) (affirming the authority of federal
courts to formulate procedural rules).
275 See In re Peterson, 253 US 300, 312–13 (1920) (explaining that “[c]ourts have (at
least in the absence of legislation to the contrary) inherent power to provide themselves
with appropriate instruments required for the performance of their duties,” including the
“authority to appoint persons unconnected with the court to aid judges in the performance
of specific judicial duties, as they may arise in the progress of a cause”) (citation omitted);
John F. Duffy, On Improving the Legal Process of Claim Interpretation: Administrative
Alternatives, 2 Wash U J L & Pol 109, 142 (2000) (noting that the “judicial power to seek
expert assistance” includes both inviting amicus briefs and “appoint[ing] nonwitness experts in appropriate cases”); Samuel Krislov, The Amicus Curiae Brief: From Friendship
to Advocacy, 72 Yale L J 694, 699 (1963) (discussing evolution of amicus curiae participation as part of courts’ inherent powers).
274
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the court fall within the category of procedural rules that are part
of the courts’ inherent constitutional power.
Having identified competing constitutional powers, which
branch would or should prevail in this hypothetical scenario?
Considering again factors such as the degree of interference into
each branch’s powers, intent to interfere with the other branch’s
powers, and historical practice, there is a strong case that the
Court should prevail. The shift from the executive branch filing
diplomatic notes to foreign governments filing their own amicus
briefs directly poses a minimal interference with the executive’s
power to communicate with foreign governments. Prior to the
shift, the executive was essentially fulfilling a ministerial, passthrough role, simply transmitting the views of foreign governments to the Court. Sometimes those views were even contrary to
the executive’s own position, as in Zenith Radio itself, the case
that prompted the Court to protest the filing of diplomatic
notes.276 If the executive wishes to contradict or simply opine on
the views of a foreign government filed before the Court, it can
file an amicus brief, and per the Court’s rules, the executive has
an automatic right to file (provided it complies with the filing
deadlines) and need not seek leave of the Court.277
By the time of the shift from diplomatic notes in 1978, longstanding historical practice also supported the filing of amicus
briefs by foreign governments.278 Foreign governments’ embassies
filed briefs as early as 1919,279 and foreign governments began filing briefs in the name of their governments, rather than their embassies, in 1952280—all without apparent objection by the executive branch.
Moreover, there is no evidence that by highlighting the noncompliance of the diplomatic-note practice with its rules the
Court intended to interfere with the executive’s power to communicate with foreign governments. To the contrary, the Court

276

See notes 75–80 and accompanying text.
See US S Ct Rule 37.4.
278 For additional details on the history of foreign sovereign amicus briefs, see
Eichensehr, 102 Va L Rev at 297–302 (cited in note 56).
279 See generally Brief of Counsel for British Embassy as Amici Curiae, Strathearn
Steamship Co v Dillon, Docket No 373 (US filed June 2, 1919).
280 See, for example, Lauritzen v Larsen, 345 US 571, 572 (1953) (noting an amicus
brief filed by Denmark). See also generally Brief of the Royal Danish Government, as Amicus Curiae, Lauritzen v Larsen, Docket No 226 (US filed Nov 26, 1952) (available on
Westlaw at 1952 WL 82186).
277
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would have been well aware that foreign governments had communicated their views to the Court directly through amicus briefs
for nearly six decades without objection by the executive. Even if
the executive could have made a claim of interference with executive authority, it had, in essence, already acquiesced to a direct
channel of communication between foreign governments and the
Supreme Court in the decades preceding the Court’s letter.281
Additionally, the Court’s move to have foreign governments’
views communicated solely by amicus briefs worked a regularization of its processes, ensuring that both the United States and
foreign governments were treated like all other parties wishing
to communicate with the Court. The fact of regularization, rather
than exceptionalism, supports the argument that the Court did
not intend to interfere with the executive; it was simply policing
compliance with its normal processes—processes derived from its
inherent authority.
For all of these reasons, had the executive continued to attempt to file diplomatic notes after receiving the Court’s letter,
that hypothetical may have been a converse Youngstown equivalent of Zivotofsky—a Category 3 case in which the presumed losing branch nonetheless prevails.
CONCLUSION
Nonexecutive conduct of foreign relations has already
sparked several recent incidents of interbranch friction. And technology, foreign governments’ increasing sophistication about the
US government, hyperfractionalization in US politics, and the
“Trump effect” may make nonexecutive foreign relations more frequent and more contentious going forward.
Moreover, the converse Youngstown framework need not be
limited in application to the conduct of foreign relations questions
that this Article addresses. Converse Youngstown can be applied
to other interbranch separation-of-powers disputes. For example,
the converse Youngstown framework could be used to analyze a
court’s attempt to solicit the views of particular executive branch
departments about a pending case. The Seventh Circuit made
281 See Bradley and Morrison, 126 Harv L Rev at 435 (cited in note 48) (discussing
acquiescence as waiver as “akin to the adverse possession doctrine in property law: if one
branch of government has been engaging in a practice for a long time without any resistance, it (and potentially also third parties) may have formed reasonable expectation
interests surrounding the practice”). See also id at 453–54 (arguing that executive silence
or acquiescence is more meaningful than congressional silence).
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such a request in 2014 in an antitrust case, when, in response to
the filing of an amicus brief for the United States signed by the
Justice Department and the Federal Trade Commission, the court
issued an order “invit[ing]” the Departments of Commerce and
State to file amicus briefs on the foreign relations impacts of the
case.282 The executive branch declined the court’s “invitation.”283
The converse Youngstown framework could also be used to assess
the constitutionality of congressional actions, such as resolutions
that purport to place limits on the president’s war powers.284
The converse Youngstown framework avoids some of the
weaknesses of the traditional Youngstown analysis, but more importantly, it fills out the picture for separation-of-powers disputes. The Youngstown and converse Youngstown frameworks together ensure that constitutional interpreters in any branch of
government and scholars outside the government can systematically evaluate competing constitutional claims to power.

282 Order of May 1, 2014, Motorola Mobility LLC v AU Optronics Corp, Civil Action
No 14-8003 (7th Cir filed May 1, 2014). See also generally Brief for the United States and
the Federal Trade Commission as Amici Curiae in Support of Panel Rehearing or Rehearing En Banc, Motorola Mobility LLC v AU Optronics Corp, Civil Action No 14-8003 (7th
Cir filed Apr 24, 2014) (available on Westlaw at 2014 WL 1878995).
283 Letter from Solicitor General Donald B. Verrilli Jr to Gino J. Agnello, Clerk of
Court, Motorola Mobility LLC v AU Optronics Corp, Civil Action No 14-8003 (7th Cir
filed May 19, 2014).
284 See, for example, War Powers Resolution, Pub L No 93-148, 87 Stat 555 (1973),
codified at 50 USC §§ 1541–48.

